

A REFLECTION ON ZAMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE-1964 TO 2021

(Paper ID: CFP/2658/2022)

¹* Wisdom Chibbonta, ²** Moses Mayondi, ³***Richard Mulenga1

¹* Planner- Provincial Planning Unit, Solwezi-Zambia: email: chibbontaw@gmail.com

²** Senior Planner - Provincial Planning Unit, Solwezi-Zambia: email: mayondi.moses@gmail.com

³***PhD Student, Dongguk University, College of Management & Economics, Seoul, South Korea:
email: richardmulenga2@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper has identified and analyzed the four developmental strategies that the Zambian state has undertaken since independence and highlighted some major positive and negative achievements of the adopted strategies on poverty, economic development and general wellbeing of citizens. Additionally, the paper has analyzed the effects of the movements or shocks in global copper prices on Zambia's development achievements. We identified and date-stamped the bubble dates and unraveled possible domestic and global events that could have triggered the copper price bubbles. Specifically, we used the Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller (GSADF) methods in Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015, PSY), the work-horse bubble detection and date stamping strategy. The key contributions of this paper to the extant literature are that, to the best of knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the Zambia's development strategies using a variety of methods including the novel PSY approach. Further, this paper is also the first to analyze and unravel the volatility of Zambia's GDP growth dependence on the volatile global copper prices from the PSY approach.

The four development strategies analyzed in this paper are State-led development, generally in the 1960s and 1980s, Structural Adjustment Program, generally in the 1990s. The third strategy is the era of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (early 2000s) and the fourth is the re-introduction of National Development Plans, generally from 2006 to date. Among the significant achievements during the sampled period is the reduction in poverty from record high of 78 percent in 1994 to around 54 percent in 2019. The economy grew largest, to nearly 10% between 1970 and 1972 during the State led era and contracted the most during the structural adjustment era, between 1993 and 1994 declining from 6.7% in 1993 to - 8.6% in 1994. It is also clear that the development approaches that were embarked on were influenced by foreign institutions such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other donor institutions especially between 1991 and 2005. This paper finds that income inequality as measured by Gini-coefficient index increased sharply from 0.48 in 2002 to 0.55 in 2004 which is 14.58% increase in income inequality among Zambians during the Poverty Reduction Strategy era. It is very clear that despite numerous pronouncements to diversify the economy away from mining, our findings show that diversification is yet to occur. Mining still remains the driver of Zambia's GDP growth. Given the high volatility of global copper prices, Zambia's GDP growth will remain volatile also given that it's driven by global copper prices.

Keywords: Development strategy, Poverty, National Development Plans, Zambia, Structural Adjustment, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

1. INTRODUCTION

Zambia is a landlocked country located in the Sub-Saharan Africa. It is located between latitudes 8° and 18° south and longitudes 22° and 34° east and covers a total area of 752,612 square kilometers. Zambia is surrounded by 8 neighboring countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo to the north; Tanzania to the north-east; Malawi to the east; Mozambique; Zimbabwe; Botswana; and Namibia to the south; and Angola to the west. These countries provide Zambia with an expanded market for its goods and services.

The country gained its political independence from Britain on 24th October, 1964. Since then, the country has experienced three major phases of governance, the multiparty system from 1964 to 1972, one party system from 1972 to 1991 and multiparty system since 1991. Zambia has abundant natural resources such as rivers, namely Zambezi, Kafue, Luangwa, Luapula, and Chambeshi Rivers. In addition to these rivers, the country also has major lakes such as Tanganyika, Mweru, Mweru Wa Ntipa, Bangweulu and the man-made lakes Kariba and Itzhi Tezhi. Other interesting features include the Victoria Falls, one of the Seven Wonders of the World. It is also endowed with various minerals and precious stones such as gold, copper, emeralds, zinc, lead and cobalt (CSO, 2014).

In 1964, the country's population stood at over 4 million, in 1980, the population increased to 5.6 million. In 1990, the population was 7.3 million while in 2000, it increased to 9.8 million. In 2010, the population increased to over 13 million ¹and the 2020 projected population was 17,885,423. ²

Zambia is currently experiencing a large demographic shift and is one of the world's youngest countries by median age. Its population, much of it urban, is growing rapidly at 2.8% per year, partly because of high fertility, resulting in the population doubling close to every 25 years. This trend is expected to continue as the large youth population enters reproductive age, which will put even more pressure on the demand for jobs, health care and other social services.

At independence in 1964, the Zambian government inherited a dual economy comprised of mining sector characterized by modern technological advances and capital-intensive equipment and the agriculture sector comprising a mix of commercial agriculture and smallholder agriculture (Republic of Zambia, 2013; Chirwa and Odhiambo, 2016). Zambia inherited a relatively healthy state of foreign reserves and had an economy mostly driven by the private sector dominated by the foreign-owned mining companies which contributed almost 50% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and government revenues. In the late 1960s, the 'Zambianisation' reforms were introduced by the government under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) which saw all foreign-owned mining companies transfer ownership to the hands of the state in line with other newly independent African countries' philosophies (Shafer, 1994).

The importance of mining sector in shaping the Zambian economy cannot be overemphasized. Copper export has provided the country with export revenues, tax revenues and employment for the majority especially the Copperbelt and North

¹ CSO, 1969, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing

² CSO, (2012) Population and Demographic Projections 2011 – 2035

Western Provinces. This has brought about neglect or lack of interest in other sectors especially in times when the local currency has appreciated during periods of commodity boom or lack of funds in times of bust (Shafer, 1994). Since the publication of the First National Development Plan (1966-1970), all national development plans (no matter their name and origin) have stressed the need to restructure or diversify the economy by giving priority to other sectors, for instance agriculture and manufacturing and thereby, lessen the dependence on copper. Notwithstanding these declarations, no significant restructuring has taken place. Zambia is still overwhelmingly dependent on copper.

Sixty years ago, Zambia and South Korea were at the same level of development with Zambia slightly better off in terms of GDP per capita. However, South Korea has been able to transform itself into an industrial state while Zambia is still struggling in the philosophy of sluggish industrial growth, extreme poverty and inequality (Seshamani, 1994; Chansa, Mubanga, Mudenda and Ndulo, 2019). In 1962, South Korea had per-capita income of US\$87 while Zambia had per capita income of US\$500. There are a lot of factors that made South Korea to achieve its industrialization when it evolved into a developmental state while for Zambia it failed to advance beyond the developmental state status due to the development approaches embarked on (Seshamani & Ndhlovu, 2016).

This paper therefore reviews secondary data on the four developmental strategies that the Zambian state has undertaken since independence and then highlight the positives and negatives of these strategies on poverty, development and employment creation. The three-fold objectives of this paper are: The first goal is to identify the

development strategies that Zambia has undertaken since independence in 1964. Second, we discuss the implications of these strategies on poverty, development and employment creation in the country. The third objective is to analyze Zambia's development strategies from the movements of global copper prices. This was done by identifying and date-stamping the bubble dates and unravel possible domestic and global events that could have triggered the copper price bubbles. Specifically, we used the Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller (GSADF) methods in Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015, PSY), the work-horse bubble detection and date stamping strategy. At the basic level, an asset bubble refers to price hikes of financial assets such as bonds, stocks, real asset or commodities not supported by underlying economic fundamentals.

At the core of asset bubbles is the mispricing of assets (Fama, 1970). In keeping with the efficient market and/or random walk economic theory, bubbles arise whenever there is a deviation from ideal/efficient market conditions. More often than not, shocks tend to cause disequilibria in markets and the ensuing bubbles may not be mitigated using classical models whereby asset prices are equated to their fundamental values. Policy makers have to walk a fine line because the existence of a bubble may be an indicator that the market or economy has complex structural issues that cannot easily be solved by simply bursting the bubble, because in doing so, the economic problems caused by market bubbles may either be mitigated or exacerbated (Barlevy, 2007).

Zambia has experienced four development strategies since independence. The strategies identified and analyzed in this paper are; State-led development, generally in the 1960s and 1980s,

Structural Adjustment Program, generally in the 1990s. Then followed by the era of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (early 2000s) and finally the re-introduction of National Development Plans, generally from 2006 to date.

Development strategies are defined as sets of policies adopted by any government with the aim of achieving its prioritized objectives such as economic growth or poverty reduction. Therefore, strategies are a reflection of concepts of development process and are influenced by prevailing policy, political atmosphere and theoretical philosophies. Example, could be "state-led industrialization" or "open market-driven development" which are motivated by different developmental models (Bratton, 1994; Breisinger and Thurlow, 2008).

1.1 ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

This paper is organized as follows; section 2 deals with bubble identification and date-stamping strategies. Section 3 analyzes the State-Led Approach to Development (1975-1990). Section 4 deals with the Era of Structural Adjustment Approach to Development (1991-2001) while section 5 analyzes the Era of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach to Development (2002-2004). Section 6 considers the Era of National Development Plans (NDPs) Approach to Development (2006 to Date), section 7 conclusion and section 8 acknowledgement.

2.0 BUBBLE IDENTIFICATION AND DATE STAMPING STRATEGY

In order to identify and test for the episodes of periodically collapsing copper price bubbles or explosions and ascertain the beginning and the end dates (date-stamping) of explosive behavior of price bubbles, we employ the rolling recursive

algorithm Backwards General Augmented Dickey Fuller (GSADF) test statistics proposed in Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015, PSY). One advantage of using the GSADF to test for explosive behavior in asset prices is that we do not need to have information regarding the market fundamentals. The recursive evolving algorithm enables real time identification of bubbles and collapse with the flexibility of allowing for the presence of multiple structural breaks within the sample period. Thus, our empirical analysis focuses more on Backwards ADF (BADF) or GSADF in PSY (2015)

2.1 ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

The Phillips, Shi and Yu, PSY (2015a, b,) is based on the recursive rolling window. The method is based on an ADF model specification for the fitted regression equation but uses flexible window widths in its implementation to take time-varying dynamics and structural breaks into consideration (Phillips & Shi, 2018). The recursive evolving algorithm enables real time- identification of bubbles and collapse with the flexibility of allowing for presence multiple structural breaks within the sample period. Thus, our empirical analysis focuses more on Backwards ADF (BADF) or GSADF in PSY (2015).

For each observation of interest, the PSY test ranges from r_0 to 1. It is recommended that

$r_0 = 0.01 + 1.8/\sqrt{T}$, where T is the sample length and r_0 is the minimum window required to initiate the regression (Gharib, et al 2021, Phillip & Shi, 2018).

Suppose the observation of interest is r. PSY computes the ADF test statistic respectively from backward expanding sample sequence. We let r_1 and r_2 be the start and end points of the regression

sample respectively. The ADF statistic computed from this sample is $ADF_{r_1}^{r_2}$. The end point of all samples is fixed on the observation of interest such that $r_2 = r^*$, and allow the starting point r_1 to vary within the range $[0, r^* - r_0]$. The PSY statistic is the Supremum taken over the values of all ADF statistics in the entire recursion, represented mathematically as;

$$PSY_{r^*}(r_0) = \sup_{r_1 \in [0, r^* - r_0], r_2 = r^*} \{ADF_{r_1}^{r_2}\} \text{ or } GSADF(r_0) = \{ADF_{r_1}^{r_2}\} \quad (1)$$

With the limit distribution

$$\sup_{r_2 \in [r_0, 1], r_0 \in [0, r_2 - r_0]} \left\{ \frac{(1/2)r_w [W(r_2)^2 - W(r_1)^2 - r_w] - \int_{r_1}^{r_2} W(r)dr [W(r_2) - W(r_1)]}{r_w^{1/2} \left\{ r_w \int_{r_1}^{r_2} W(r)^2 dr - \left[\int_{r_1}^{r_2} W(r)dr \right]^2 \right\}^{1/2}} \right\}$$

Where $r_w = r_2 - r_1$ is the expanding window size and $W(\cdot)$ is the Wiener process or Brownian Motion process. Comparison of GSADF test statistic with the right tailed values enables us to test for unit root test statistic for unit root hypothesis against exuberance or periodically bubble collapsing behavior. If the null hypothesis (H_0) of the unit root is rejected, then during the second stage, the GSADF test identifies the exact episodes during which the time series show mildly explosive features. The final stage involves SADF procedure matching the sequence of the recursive, backward ADF (BSADF) test statistics against the right tailed critical values of the limit distribution of the standard ADF test statistic.

Phillip & Shi (2018) explain that the null hypothesis (H_0) of the PSY essentially captures normal market behavior and asserts that asset prices follow a martingale process with a mild drift function such that:

$$\gamma_t = g_T + \gamma_{t-1} + u_t \quad (3)$$

Where $g_T = k_{t-1}$ and k is constant, $\gamma > 1/2$ and T is sample size. Under the PSY/GSADF procedure, the regression model chosen is

$$\Delta \gamma_t = \mu + \rho \gamma_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{\rho} \phi_j \Delta \gamma_{t-j} + v_t \quad (4)$$

Where v_t is the regression error assumed to satisfy $v_t \text{ i.i.d.} \sim (0, \sigma^2)$, and ρ is lag terms of $\Delta \gamma_t$ and sorts out the potential correlation problems; Suppose there is only one episode of the sample originating from r_e to r_f . Phillips and Shi (2015, 2018) assert that the estimated periods and termination dates are given by the following equations:

$$\hat{r}_e = \inf \{r^*: PSY_{r^*}(r_0) > cv_r(\beta_T)\} \quad (5)$$

$$r^* \in [r_0, 1]$$

$$\hat{r}_f = \inf \{r^*: PSY_{r^*}(r_0) < cv_r(\beta_T)\} \quad (6)$$

$$r^* \in [r_e, 1]$$

where $cv_r(\beta_T)$ is the quantile of the distribution of $PSY_{r^*}(r_0)$ of equation 1

2.2 FINDINGS


Generally, copper prices were volatile as can easily be observed from the GSADF test results in figure 2.1. The volatility of copper prices is largely associated with demand and supply that are not sensitive to price changes in the short run (Antonio Spilimbergo, 1999). The copper prices experienced more negative volatility than positive volatility for the period 1965-2020. That is, the copper prices in the sample period experienced

more negative bubble periods than positive bubble periods (refer to the graph in dark blue color in Fig 2.1). The trend of the current and expected future level of the world market copper price is one of the major determinants of copper production and export inform the expected future management decisions regarding ongoing operations and future production.

Generally speaking, it is difficult for mining companies to make production changes in the short run because this implies tying up large amounts of capital investments in the risky volatile and short run unpredictable copper industry (Zambia Basic Economic Report, World Bank, 1977). Perhaps this explains why copper production (supply) is less responsive to short run price changes or price bubbles.

Given that the demand and supply of copper are not very responsive to price changes in the short run, it is difficult to find related policy changes in literature that reflect the daily volatility of copper prices, and by extension the bubbles, in the short run. To this end therefore, our narrative on the bubbles have taken long run formats.

Figure 2.1 GSADF Test result 1975-2021



Note: Bubble length is determined by BSADF test with 95% critical values from a recursive Monte-


Carlo simulations in e-views. The start date is when the bubble positively crosses the 95% critical sequence and end date when the bubble negatively crosses 95% critical sequence.

Table 1: BSADF Bubble length Estimates

BSADF	Test Results	
Start(Bubble Explosion)	End(implosion)	Duration/days
1.1979:M2:3	1979:M5:2	89
2.1980:M1:29	1980:M3:20	50
3.1987:M7:2	1993:M10:1	89
4.1993:M5:12	1993:M7:12	60
5.1994:M6:21	1994:M10:26	121
6.2003:M12:23	2004:M4:13	103
7.2005:M12:14	2006:M7:27	223
8.2008:M10:20	2009:M1:28	98
9.2020:M12:14	2021:M6:3	169

3. THE STATE-LED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT (1975-1990)

Figure 3.1: Zambia's GDP growth between 1964 and 1990



Source: Computed from World Bank's Development Indicators, WDI

Copper prices rose steadily from 1964 to 1970, boosted by the Vietnam War, and thus became the world's third largest producer of copper (Hobson, Williams and Roberts, 2021).

The country experienced rapid economic growth stimulated by government expenditure on infrastructure and services, and investment in import substituting manufacturing enterprises between 1960 and 1970 (Fundanga and Mwaba, 2005). Between 1966 and 1970, Zambia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged 11.4 percent, and for the entire period 1966-1976, GDP growth averaged 8.7 percent (CSO, Zambia).

The experience of GDP growth in 1980 is associated with Copper price bubble that started on February 1 1980, attributed to the second oil crisis associated with the revolution in Iran (caused sharp rise in oil prices) coupled with accelerated global inflation in 1979 (Cooper, R.N,1994). This price bubble did not benefit Zambia because Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) declined from 97.6 % in 1979 to 73.9% in 1980 (World Bank Indicators, 2021). The bubble implosion occurred because the oil crisis improved slightly and so was global inflation arising from the tightening of the monetary policy by the Federal Reserve Bank which plunged the U.S economy into a deeper recession (The New York Times, November 24, 1980).

Literature posits that around 1960s when most African countries were gaining independence, African leaders decided to embark on industrialization strategy in order to catch up with the rest of the world and also to reduce their dependency on their former colonial masters by becoming self-reliant through investing in economic infrastructure for industrial production (Chansa, Mubanga, Mudenda, and Ndulo, 2019;

Bhagavan, 1978). In 1964, Zambia was perceived to have a bright future due to its endowment with vast natural resources, including favorable agro ecological conditions and large copper deposits.

To achieve industrial base required for self-sufficiency, Zambia employed a number of policies among them public investment in infrastructure such as roads, rail lines, oil pipeline, universities, secondary schools and hospitals in all districts. Statistics reveal that in 1960 there were only 2,500 Africans in secondary schools and by 1971, the number of secondary school pupils increased to over 54,000. The number of university graduates were fewer than 100 Zambians at independence (Mwanakatwe, 1964). The construction and opening of the University of Zambia in 1965 made it easy for Zambia to increase the number of graduates and by 1971 there were 2,000 students. This made Zambians to finally begin to predominate in the upper ranks of the civil service, the army, businesses, and other professions. However, the copper industry still relied heavily on white expertise, but in 1966 black mine workers secured a large increase in pay, which soon affected wage levels in the mines generally (Daniel, 1979; Hobson, Williams and Roberts, 2021). Other policies pursued were the creation of State-Owned Enterprises such as Zambia State Insurance, Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), Zambia Telecommunication Company, Lint Company of Zambia Limited (LINTCO), INDECO, TAZAMA pipeline among others. State-led financial institutions owned by the government included Zambia National Commercial Bank and Lima bank among others (Krueger, 1990). Other policies included government regulation of almost all spheres of economic activities, control of prices and restrictions on international trade through setting up quotas, tariffs embargoes in order to

protect infant industries (Hobson, Williams and Roberts, 2021). Put simply, the creation of the Zambian state enterprise sector after independence was primarily to respond to the inadequacies of the existing private sector in meeting the states' developmental objectives of becoming industrialized and self-sufficiency.

This strategy pursued by the state enterprise sector was designed to achieve economic diversification through the reinvestment of the revenues that were generated by the copper industry (Jones and Mason, 1982; and De Alessi, 1982). However, from the mid-1970s, declines in the international price of copper undermined the ability of state enterprises to implement this strategy, and although the Zambian state undertook a variety of measures to revitalize the sector, by the end of the 1980s it was commercially and financially unsustainable (Craig, 1999).

Import-led investment required foreign borrowing which majority of it came from bilateral and multilateral official development assistance. These assistances were not channeled toward increasing the country's capacity to export but tended to focus on the larger economic picture. This widened the country's debt-servicing costs and external indebtedness coupled with unfavorable global trends such as oil price shocks of 1970s. As a result, Zambia found itself in a situation where external debt piled-up accompanied by capital flight (Krueger, 1990; Fundanga and Mwaba, 1997).

After two decades of building up enterprises, enjoying free education and assisting neighboring countries obtain political independence, Zambia descended into a macroeconomic crisis characterized by agricultural and rural incomes stagnation. This was

compounded by the collapse of the mining industry due to sanctions leading to severe poverty and malnutrition (Resnick and Thurlow, 2008). The period of state-led development was characterized by an investment–savings gap. This made the state to enter into foreign borrowing to be able to supply the imports needed to invest in building up productive capacity in the real sector. The performance of the state enterprise sector over the subsequent one and a half decades proved to be disappointing as it fell into a malady of low profitability, under-investment and high indebtedness compounded by the decline in copper prices. In the 1980s, the Zambian Government worked with the World Bank and other donors to revitalize the State-Owned Enterprises that were performing poorly but there was little success (Pillay, 2002). The government budget was running on huge deficit due to financing of poorly performing state-owned companies. This made the Zambian Government to come under increasing pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other donors to pursue an orthodox or prescribed structural adjustment program in which privatization of state enterprises and liberalization of the economy were key component (PMRC, 2019).

President Kenneth Kaunda was quoted in the late 1970s saying *“We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths.” I and Zambia is cursed. Its debts are huge; its copper industry is moribund; its ore reserves are dwindling; and no new sectors show promise. Twenty-five years ago, however, Zambia boasted a world-class mining industry and the highest per capita income in Africa”*.

3.1 POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

Some of the positive results of the state-led development approach were the creation of industries in each province, employment creation, and development of infrastructure across the country such as schools, roads, rails, hospitals and housing infrastructure. Others included the sustained economic growth, human development and connectivity improvement.


3.2 NEGATIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

Some of the negative results of the state-led development approach were the shortages of essential commodities across the country resulting in riots, increased budgetary and balance of payments deficits due to poor performance of state-owned enterprises and high international debt burden and servicing costs. Zambia's productive sector was largely composed of firms that were internationally uncompetitive in that they were not only unable to compete in the export market but also incoming imports had tariffs and other protective barriers that adversely distorted the price structure in the country (Saasa, 1996).

These problems were being experienced by most African countries including Zambia. As a result of these problems, IMF and World Bank advised these countries to abandon state-led approach in order to receive donor aid as well help on debt servicing (Pillay, 2002). To deal with these problems, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was proposed by multilateral organizations such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as solution.

4.0 THE ERA OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT (1991-2001)


Figure 4.1: Zambia's GDP growth: 1991 - 2001



Source: Computed from World Bank's World Development Indicators

Zambia experienced a protracted recession between 1993 and 1995 as can be observed from figure 4.1. At the time of bubble implosion on October 26 1994, the average world copper price plummeted to lowest, at \$47.689 lower than the 1986 monthly average of \$47.76 (World Bank, 2021). Empirically, when we test and compare the standardized annual global copper prices and annual percentage growth of gross domestic product for Zambia, there is a convergence in 1994 (see figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Standardized Global Annual Copper Price Vs Standardized Zambia's GDP growth 1985-2020



Source: Computed from World Bank Development Indicators, 2021

It is noted from figures 4.1 and 4.2 that Zambia's annual GDP growth in percentage terms mimics the trend in global copper prices confirming the theory that Zambia's economy is still dependent on the mining industry despite recent policy pronouncements of diversifying the economy from mining. This means that Zambia's economic prospects remain vulnerable to frequent global copper price shocks.

The various stability measures and structural adjustment programs effected from 1973 until 1990 failed to address the structural problems of Zambian economy including diversifying the economy away from copper dependency and addressing the inefficiencies in agricultural production (Lise_Rakner, 2003).

Zambia implemented a partial Structural Adjustment Program between 1983 and 1991 which involved, among other things, the devaluation of currency, limiting wage increases to 5%, decontrol of prices of essential commodities and the removal of subsidies on maize and fertilizers. This program was however, cancelled by President Kaunda in 1987 after it failed to achieve its intended objectives (Ncube, Sakala, & Ndulo, 1989; Simutanyi, 1996).

The mismanagement of the adopted state-led development approach in the late 1980s and early 1990s led most African countries to experience macroeconomic imbalances. These challenges included high levels of indebtedness and debt servicing costs, deficits in the balance of payments and budgets. To deal with these problems economists, especially those in the World Bank and IMF, advised the governments that nationalized industries could not compete in the global market and as such to development through the private sector in a free economy was seen as the only way

forward (Nelson, 1996; Ramamurti and Raymond, 1991).

The MMD Government under President Fredrick Chiluba agreed to that thinking and embraced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which were imposed by the multilateral agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as a non-negotiable condition for granting loans and for receiving donor support (Pillay, 2002). During the SAP period 1999 - 2001, the macroeconomic objectives pursued by the government were to achieve a sustained economic growth of about 5 percent a year, reduce inflation to 4 percent, and strengthen international gross official reserves from the equivalent of two weeks of imports cover to about three months in 2001 (GRZ, 1999).

These Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were premised on the need to recover the economy through stabilization or demand management policies aimed at achieving a sound and stable macroeconomic environment conducive for economic growth. It was envisaged that SAPs would bring about stabilization and growth, reduced external debts burden, arrest hyper-inflationary pressure that had characterized the 1980s, eliminate persistent budget deficits, and reduce public expenditures while encouraging exports through trade liberalization (Economic Justice Bulletin, July-September 2001). These objectives were to be achieved through the implementation of the following;

- **Exchange rate devaluation:** By making domestic currencies worth less in relation to foreign currencies, imports were to be discouraged because they became more expensive while exports were encouraged

because they became cheaper hence enhanced global competitiveness and be able to address trade and balance of payment imbalances being experienced.

- **Fiscal austerity:** Reducing government budgetary deficits incurred by the promotion of foreign borrowing to foster import-led investment required lowering government spending and increasing government tax collection.
- **Financial deregulation and monetary reform:** The encouragement of borrowing without an accompanying strong increase in production had fostered strong inflationary tendencies. The liberalization of financial markets along with the use of high interest rates as the principal tool of monetary policy was designed to control inflation by making it less attractive to hold money as cash, thus withdrawing it from the economy.
- **Deregulation of the economy:** To improve economic efficiency and allow markets to allocate resources, there was a concerted effort to loosen government regulations that restricted economic activity.
- **Trade liberalization:** While the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade reduced the cost of imports, including imported inputs, it did so by less than the increases in prices brought about by devaluation. At the same time, trade liberalization made exporting easier, so trade liberalization promoted exports while imports were compressed (Shafer, 1994).

Privatization: To make state-owned enterprises more efficient by making them more responsive to the signals produced by a freer, better functioning market, eliminating unnecessary employment and bureaucratic interference and

reducing debt. At the time of privatization, Zambia had 152 state-owned enterprises which in the process of being privatized were sold off as 331 separate companies or units (RAIDS, 2013). In 1990 a policy of limited privatization was introduced which was subsequently extended to cover the entire state enterprise sector. By the end of 1998, the majority of state enterprises were privatized and substantial progress had been achieved in the divestiture of the state mining enterprise, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (Craig, 1999). The pursuit of economic liberalization produced adverse results in that it did not recognize the existing institutional problems such as lack of capital, lack of management experience among Zambian-owned private sector, as well as private hands of the political incentives emerging from the state (Bates & Collier, 1995).

4.1 POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

The introduction of SAP brought about positive effects in the economy such as liberalized economy which opened up the economy and a lot of goods that were unavailable were made available for citizens hence increase their choices. Further, the privatization of the State-owned enterprises that heavily were surviving on government support reduced pressure on the treasury and budget deficit (Saasa, 1996; World Bank. 1994).

The domestic absorption was increased leading to economic growth and development. The domestic entrepreneurship drive was awakened in the citizens due to the open market policies embarked on such as the establishment of the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in 1991 through an Act of Parliament and the Village Industries Services (VIS), to promote the Micro,

Small and Medium Enterprise sector (MSMEs)(GRZ, 2008).

4.2 NEGATIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

Some of the negative effects of the policies implemented were high unemployment due to redundancy and retrenchment of workers both in privatized companies and public sector. On September 1, 1997, the government adopted a medium-term public service reform program aimed at reducing the size of the non-military public service from 136,775 to 80,000 persons by end-1999. In the context of this program, about 7,600 public servants were separated in December 1997, and another 7,900 employees were retrenched in 1998 (GRZ, 1999).

Furthermore, these retrenchments resulted in high poverty levels as most people were left with no incomes. As result, social woes increased such as crime, gender-based violence and street kids. In addition, the debt levels increased resulting in high indebtedness and government's failure to provide social services such as education requisites and medicines in hospitals (Carter, 1993). In 1999 Zambia was one of the poorest nations in the world and World Bank classified Zambia as a Least Developed Country.

The UNDP Human Development Report 1999 ranked Zambia 156 out of 174 countries, having fallen consistently over the past years, from 136 in 1996, to 142 in 1997, to 146 in 1998. CSO estimated that 73% of the population had incomes below the minimum level determined by CSO. Further CSO revealed that the percentage of people who were living in poverty increased from 70% of the population in 1991 to about 74% in 1993,


decreased to 69% in 1996 and then rose again to 73% in 1998.

The other negative result was the loss of industrial base as most of the privatized enterprises did not survive but the foreign buyers stripped-off these enterprises of their valuable machinery.

Because of these high poverty levels and low economic growth recorded by most African countries, the IMF, World Bank and the international community introduced new policy to reduce poverty levels.

THE ERA OF POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEG PAPER(PRSP) APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT (2002-2004)

Figure 5.1 Zambia Annual GDP Growth 2002-2004



Source: World Bank

According to findings (see, table 1) there was only one bubble associated with this era (bubble 6). In 2003 the copper prices bottomed up and this coincides with the positive bubble explosion on December 23 2003. This bubble was driven by the demand arising from the housing boom in the United States as well as increased demand from India and China (The New-York Times, November5, 2005). However, the bubble implosion on April 13, 2004 due to the intermittent decrease in demand for copper from the U.S, China and India.

According to figure 5.1, Zambia experienced sustained annual GDP growth between 2002 and 2005.

The 2002 study by the Jubilee-Zambia entitled "Where Does the Money Go?" found that the government of Zambia over the period 1990 - 2000 had spent as high as over 12 percent of its GDP on debt service payments while health and education sectors received 2% and 3% respectively.

This revelation necessitated for the need to introduce Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a new development approach in Zambia. The implementation of the PRSP in African was premised on the realization of the need to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction caused by SAP. PRSP placed greater emphasis on measures to improve public resource management and accountability. PRSPs designated the country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three-year horizon to promote broad-based growth and poverty reduction. Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) were required by IMF and World Bank to prepare PRSP as a precondition for debt relief/cancellation (AFRODAD, 2003). PRSP however, was different from SAP in that while SAP was entirely driven by external funders, the preparation of PRSP was driven mainly by the country's themselves with the participation of civil society organizations in order to encourage accountability of governments to their own people and domestic voters rather than to external funders (Ibid).

The main focus of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers where on the achievement of a strong sustained economic growth which was sufficient to bring about job creation, promotion of income generating activities, equity and tax

revenues for the state as a sustainable tool for reducing poverty. In addition, Zambia projected to achieve a growth rate of between 5 to 8 percent per annum for poverty reduction (GRZ, 2002).

The macroeconomic policies pursued under PRSP were not different from those of SAP in that both focused on improving fiscal discipline of governments to minimize budget deficit, monetary policies to control inflation, free-floating exchange rates, and privatization of the remaining state enterprises as well as to pursue free market economic policies (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003).

Zambia Gini index (World Bank estimate)1991-2020




Figure 5.2 Source: Computed from World Bank's WDI

When the PRSP is analyzed from Gini index perspective as depicted by figure 5.2, it is evident that income inequality increased sharply from 0.48 in 2002 to 0.55 in 2004 which is 14.58% increase in income inequality in Zambia. The trend generally continued beyond 2004. It can be inferred that income inequality (income poverty) increased during the PRSP strategy era.

5.1 POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

The implementation of the poverty reduction strategy paper saw Zambia achieve debt cancellation by the debt community. Zambia

obtained debt relief through the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. This minimized the country's external debt commitments, which were standing at \$6.5 billion at the end of 1999. By having reached the HIPC decision point in December 2000, Zambia reduced its debt servicing payments during 2001-2003 from roughly \$600 million to \$165 million per year. At completion point, which was 2003, Zambia's creditors wrote-off some \$3.8 billion of debt in nominal terms (GRZ, 2002).

Significant progress was recorded at Macroeconomic level such as real GDP growth increased from 3.3 percent in 2002 to 5.1 percent in 2003. Domestic budget deficit was contained at less than 2 percent of GDP by June 2004 from 5 percent at close of 2003, the level of interest rates fell while Inflation rate fluctuated between 17.2 percent in December 2003 and 18.6 percent in June 2004 (ZPRSP, 2005).

The country recorded increased fiscal discipline in public spending coupled with reduced corruption and poverty levels. This was seen through increased expenditures in health, education, increased investment in infrastructure development, and the lifting of wage freeze burden. This saw Zambia's economy grow, prices of commodities dropping and general improvement in the livelihood of the people (Chansa, Mubanga, Mudenda, and Ndulo, 2019). The prudent fiscal policy resulted in improved macroeconomic environment and restored credibility with the donor community which further allowed for an increased funding towards poverty reduction programs (GRZ, 2005). There was improved focus on cross-cutting issues such as gender and that saw the institutionalization and mainstreaming of gender matters in national planning and budgeting.


5.2 NEGATIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper approach had its own negative results towards achieving its intended purpose. The recorded improvements in Macroeconomic fundamentals did not translate into significant poverty reduction (Mphuka, Kaonga and Tembo, 2017). During the period of PRSP, there was high dependence on foreign donor financing due to restrictions in the financing framework provided by the IMF and World Bank. In 2001 the national budget for Zambia was 52% donor supported although in 2002 there was a donor dependent reduction on the budget to 39.6% (AFRODAD, 2003).

Despite gender receiving more attention than any other cross cutting issues, there was no sufficient policy priorities and budget commitments. The role of civil society was formal but there was little participation during implementation.

6. THE ERA OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS (NDPs) APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT (2006 TO DATE)

Figure 6.1: Zambia's GDP growth between 2007 and 2020



Source: Computed from World Bank's WDIs

Figure 6.1 shows that Zambia experienced sustained reduction in annual GDP growth since 2011.

From the bubble detection and date stamping analysis results (see figure 2.1), the bubble exploded on October 20 2008 during which period copper price was on the upward trajectory. The copper price bubble explosion was partly driven by an increased demand for copper by China (The New York times, October 13, 2008). However, this demand from China was not sustainable. The great recession of 2007-2008 resulted in bubble implosion 98 days later on January 1 2009. That is, the global financial panic and the economic slowdown put a temporary end to the commodity bull market and sent prices tumbling steeply for many of the raw ingredients of the world economy including Zambia's copper (The New York times, October 13, 2008).

At the expiration of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers around 2005, most countries had already started using or were developing national development plans. The history of National Development Planning has been anchored in the failure of centrally planned economies in the 1950s and 1960s. Many developing countries have their own developments guided through well-organized processes, policies and practices that are termed as the 'new national planning'.

The re-introduction of national development plans in Zambia was not new because the country has had 1st to 4th national development plans before this practice was discredited and abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s as a remnant of directed economies and state-led development (Chimhowu, et al, 2019). The number of countries with a National Development Plan (NDP) were 62

in 2006 and the number doubled to 134 in 2018. Nearly 80 per cent of the world's total population were living in a country with a national development plan of one form or another (Munro, 2019).

The rise of the 'new' development planning can be traced back to the late-2000s or 2010s in most emerging countries. It was observed that the catalyst for the Zambian government under President Levy Mwanawasa to reintroduce planning in the country was due to the desire for aid harmonization process that saw multilateral and bilateral agencies attempt to streamline aid inflows into recipient countries, reduce the associated administrative costs for local officials, and generally improve aid efficacy (Chimhowu, Hulme and Munro, 2019; Musiker, 2019).

“The reintroduction of development planning in Zambia in 2006 formed part of Mwanawasa's attempts to shore up his legitimacy among the electorate and to build a political coalition to withstand a powerful faction within his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by former president Frederick Chiluba”. This saw Zambia prepare the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010 - the first development plan to be implemented since planning was abandoned in 1991. The plan was heavily influenced by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that preceded it (Musiker, 2019).

It is argued that the return to national planning in 2006 did not represent a return to the developmentalism that characterized the post-independence era of development planning rather represented a continuation of the 'neoliberal populism' introduced with the PRSP. As a result, there was a failed attempt to alleviate poverty

brought about by structural adjustment program. In short, the rise of the 'new' development planning in Zambia was not accompanied by a corresponding return of any sort of 'new' developmentalism (Musiker, 2019).

The other reason why most emerging economies came back to national planning was to consolidate the gains made in the implementation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed upon by the 189 leaders of United Nations member countries in 2000. African countries in particular realized that sustained economic growth was a foundation for poverty reduction and social development and thus should occur within the framework of good planning, with strong leadership and institutions (UNECA, 2017). The Zambian government has since prepared and implemented about four National Development Plans namely; Fifth National Development Plan (2006-2010), Sixth National Development Plan (2011-2015), Revised Sixth National Development Plan (2012-2016) and the Seventh National Development Plan (2017-2021). All these plans were aimed at making Zambia a middle and prosperous- income country by 2030 in line with the vision 2030 and Africa Agenda 2063.

6.1 POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

After 15 years of significant socio-economic progress and achieving middle-income status in 2011, Zambia's economic performance has stalled in recent years. Between 2000 and 2014 the annual real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate averaged 6.8%. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate slowed to 3.1% per annum between 2015 and 2019, mainly attributed to falling copper prices and declines in agricultural

output and hydro-electric power generation due to insufficient rains, and insufficient policy adjustment to this exogenous shock (World Bank, 2021).

The resurgence of National Development Plans saw Zambia record growth in selected macroeconomic indicators between 2006 and 2009. Domestic debt as a proportion of GDP, fell from 20 percent in 2006 to 16.2 percent in 2009 although it has increased to US \$11.48 billion (49.8 percent of GDP) at end 2019 (GRZ, 2020).

During the period 2006 to 2010, annual real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was favourable, averaging 8.7 percent, with the highest annual growth rate registered at 10.3 percent in 2010. Between 2011 and 2016, however, the economic growth rate slowed down, and averaged 4.9 percent.

During the period 2017-2021, growth declined further with the real growth rate averaging 1.4 percent largely due to unfavourable weather conditions which impacted the agriculture and energy sectors in the earlier years of the period. Another notable development was in 2020 when economic growth contracted by 2.8 percent, registering the first recession since 1998. This was mainly due to the effect of disruptions in supply chains and containment measures associated with the COVID-19 pandemic on sectors such as tourism, construction, wholesale and retail trade as well as manufacturing (GRZ, 2022).

The domestic revenue collections increased to 17.4 percent of GDP in 2017, 19.1 percent of GDP in 2018 and 20.2 percent of GDP in 2019. This was against the targeted 18 percent, 17.7

percent and above 18 percent in the respective years.

Zambia has seen increased infrastructural development ranging from the construction of roads, Toll plazas, and bridges such as Kazungula Bridge, housing facilities and operationalization of the Multi-Facility Economic Zones in various provinces (RDA, 2019). As at December 31, 2014; 2,616 Km of roads had been procured out of which 406.09 Km had been surfaced and opened to traffic while other roads were at different levels of completion. Further-more the Link Zambia program, since its inception, created over 18,000 jobs in the road construction industry (GRZ, 2015).

5.2 NEGATIVE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGY

The implementation of the envisaged fiscal outlays proved to be a challenge, mainly due to shortfalls in domestic revenues and grants from Cooperating Partners. As a result, fiscal deficit averaged 1.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the period against the FNDP average target of 1.7 percent of GDP. The budget deficit over the period 2017 to 2019 averaged 7.6 percent of GDP compared to a planned average of less than 5 percent of GDP. In 2019, the deficit increased to 9.1 percent of GDP against a targeted rate of 6.5 percent (GRZ, 2020). As a proportion of GDP, the public debt stock (domestic and external) significantly increased from 22 percent in 2006 to 119 percent in 2021. The stock of domestic debt (government securities and bonds) increased to K193 billion by the end of 2021 from K6.24 billion in 2006 (GRZ, 2022).

On the external side, the debt stock increased from US\$961 million in 2006 to US\$1.1

billion at the end of 2010. The stock of external debt increased substantially from 2012, following the issuance of Eurobonds in 2012, 2014 and 2015. Consequently, the external debt stock reached US\$6.94 billion at the close of 2016. The stock increased further to US\$13.04 billion at the end of 2021. In addition, the Government had guaranteed external borrowing amounting to US\$1.53 billion, mostly for power projects in the energy sector (ibid).

Total domestic revenue collections during the FNDP period averaged 17.5 percent and were below the average target of 17.7 percent of GDP.

As at end of December 2020, Zambia's total public debt stood at USD 18.88 billion broken down as USD 12.74 billion Central Government external debt including existing principal arrears and USD equivalent 6.14 billion or K 130.2 billion domestic debt. Annual inflation was lowered to an average of 11.3 percent as compared to 20 percent recorded during the PRSP/TNDP period. Inflation remained in double digits throughout 2020 averaging 15.7% and reached a record high of 26.6% in July 2021 (Zamstat, 2021). Zambia became the first country in Africa to default on its Eurobond debt post covid-19.

The national poverty rate remained largely unchanged between 2010 and 2015 despite real GDP per capita growing by 2 percent per year. There were, however, marked differences between rural and urban areas. Poverty in rural areas rose from 73.6 percent in 2010 to 76.7 percent in 2015 with 82 percent of the poor living in rural areas. In urban areas, by contrast, poverty fell slightly from 25.7 percent in 2010 to 23.4 percent in 2015. Average poverty rate for Zambia increased from 43.6% in 1996 to 58.7% in 2015 growing at an

average annual rate of 5.50%. With the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic coupled with high cost of living, the poverty levels have worsened (World Bank, 2020).

7.0 CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined the four developmental strategies that the Zambian state has undertaken since independence and highlighted some major positive and negative achievements of the adopted strategies on poverty, economic development and general wellbeing of citizens. The four development strategies outlined were State-led development, generally in the 1960s and 1980s, Structural Adjustment Program, generally in the 1990s. Then followed by the era of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (early 2000s) and the re-introduction of National Development Plans, generally from 2006 to date.

At the national level, the Gini index which is a measure of income inequality equality rose from 55.6 in 2010 to 57.1 in 2015. In 2021, it remained at 57.1 and third from the most unequal country in Zambia (World Population Review, 2021). Significant achievements have been recorded such as reduction in poverty from record high of 78 percent to around 54 percent. The economy has grown although not proportional to the growth in the population. It is clear also that the development approaches that were embarked on

especially between 1991 and 2005 were largely influenced by foreign institutions such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other donor institutions.

Further, it is very clear that the failure of the plans to achieve the intended targets could be attributed to some degree on the haste manner in which plans were prepared as they were a requirement of some sort to receiving aid from the external organizations.

It is very clear that Global Copper prices have had significant impact in driving Zambia's economic growth and GDP growth as can be seen by the various bubbles observed at various time intervals.

8.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Gratitude goes to the members of staff at Provincial Planning Unit-Solwezi for their encouragement and support given to us during the research. Further appreciation goes to the Mr. Kamwenesha Kaela, Advisor at International Journal for Scientific Research for his guidance. Finally, we would like to thank God Almighty for His providence and keeping us in good health during the research time.

REFERENCES

- [1] AFRODAD, (2003). A Critical Analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPS) Process and Outcomes: The Case of Zambia, Harare: High Gloss Printers.
- [2] Angus, H. (1976) World Trade Outlook, 1976-1980 Available at <https://www.econbiz.de/Record/gainers-and-losers-in-the-1973-commodity-boom-developing-countries-prospects-to-1980-hone-angus/10002859354>.
- [3] Barlevy, G. (2007) Economic Theory and Asset Bubbles. Available at <https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedhew:y:2007:i:qiii:p:44-59:n:v.31no.3>
- [4] Bhagavan, M. (1978). Zambia: Impact of Industrial Strategy on Regional Imbalance and Social Inequality. SIDA Research Report (44).
- [5] Bratton, M. (1994). Economic crisis and political realignment in Zambia. In J. Widner, ed., Economic change and political liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- [6] Breisinger, C., and J. Thurlow. (2008). Asian growth and African development: Rethinking resource booms after structural adjustment. Discussion Paper. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- [7] Carter, S. (ed) (1993). Structural adjustment and trade liberalization: Its effect on marketing institutions and social life, Harare, FAO.
- [8] Chansa, F., Mubanga, N., Mudenda, D., and Ndulo, M. (2019). Industrial Growth and Policy in Zambia: Lessons from South Korea, *African Journal of Economic Review*, Volume VII, Issue 2.
- [9] Chimhowu, A.O, Hulme, D., and Munro, L. T. (2019). "The 'new' national development planning and global development goals: Processes and partnerships." *World Development* 120: 76-89.
- [10] Chimhowu, A.O. et al (2019). The 'New' national development planning and global development goals: Processes and partnerships, *Journal of World Development* 120, 76–89.
- [11] Chirwa, T and Odhiambo, N. (2016). Macroeconomic Policy Reform and Economic Growth in Zambia, *Euro Economica. ISSUE* 2(35). ISSN: 1582-8859.
- [12] Cooper, R.N. (1975) Commodity Booms and Busts-Research Gate. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263733468_Commodity_Booms_and_Busts
- [13] Copper Hand Book, February, (1981) World Bank Documents. Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/543761492970653971/pdf/multi-page.pdf>
- [14] Craig, J.R. (1999) State enterprise and privatization in Zambia 1968 - 1998. The University of Leeds, Department of Politics and Centre for Development Studies.
- [15] CSO, (2013) Population and Demographic Projections 2011 – 2035, Lusaka: Central Statistical Office. www.zmstats.gov.zm
- [16] CSO, (2014). Zambia in Figures 1964 - 2014, Lusaka: Central Statistical Office. www.zmstats.gov.zm
- [17] Daniel, P. (1979). Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality; Mining Labour and the Copperbelt in Zambian Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [18] De Alessi, L. (1982). "On the Nature and Consequences of Private and Public Enterprises", *Minnesota Law Review*. Vol. 67, no. 1. pp. 191-209.
- [19] Fama, E. (1970) Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. Available at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00518.x>
- [20] Fundanga, C. and Mwaba, A. (1997). Privatization of Public Enterprises in Zambia: An Evaluation of Policies, Procedures and Experiences. African Development Bank Economic Research Paper No. 35. @ www.afdb.org.

- [21] Gherib, et al. (2021) The bubble contagion effect of COVID-19 outbreak: evidence from crude oil and gold markets Finance Res. Lett., 38 (2021), p. 101703.
- [22] Government of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics--Various Issues.
- [23] GRZ, (1999). Zambia: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policy Framework Paper, 1999-2001, IMF.
- [24] GRZ, (2002). Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Republic of Zambia. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview#2>
- [25] GRZ, (2005). Zambia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report, IMF Country Report No. 05/112.
- [26] GRZ, (2008). The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy, MCTI.
- [27] GRZ, (2015) Ministerial statement on the road development programme in Zambia vis-à-vis the link Zambia 8000 and the benefits the country is so far experiencing. Delivered in Parliament on 4th March, 2015.
- [28] GRZ, (2020). Economic recovery Programme 2020-2023, Lusaka, Zambia.
- [29] GRZ, (2022). Eighth National Development Plan (8NDP), Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Lusaka, Zambia.
- [30] Hobson, R. H., Williams, G. J., and Roberts, A. D. (2021). *Zambia. Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Zambia>.
- [31] Jones, L. and Mason, E. (1982). "Role of Economic Factors in Determining the Size of the Public Enterprise Sector in Less-Developed Countries with Mixed Economies", in Jones, L. (ed), *Public Enterprise in Less-Developed Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [32] Krueger, A. (1990). "Government Failures in Development" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4(3) pp 9-24.
- [33] Lise Rakner, (2003) Political and economic liberalization in Zambia 1991-2001. Available https://scholar.google.co.kr/citations?user=Ki-Ih_IAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra
- [34] Mphuka, C., Kaonga, O., and Tembo, M. (2017) Economic Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Estimating the Growth Elasticity of Poverty in Zambia, 2006-2015, F-41302-ZMB-1.
- [35] Mudenda, D. (2019) Capital Flight through Trade Mis-Invoicing in Natural Resources: The Case of the Zambian Mines, BOZ working Paper. Available at <https://www.boz.zm/WP-2019-1-Trade-Misinvoicng-Mineral-resource-flows-June-2-2020.pdf>
- [36] Munro, L.T. (2019). 'The resurgence of national development planning: how did we get back here?' Paper presented at the International Studies Association, San Francisco, April 7.
- [37] Musiker, G. (2019). The rise, fall, and return of development planning in Zambia, Faculty of the Humanities University of Cape Town. Masters Dissertation. <http://hdl.handle.net/11427/32294>.
- [38] Mwanakatwe, J.M. (1964). *End of Kaunda Era*, Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, distributed by African Books Collective, Oxford.
- [39] Ncube, P. D., Sakala, M. & Ndulo, M. (1989). 'The International Monetary Fund and the Zambian economy', in Havnevik, K. J. (Ed), *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute for African Studies.
- [40] Nelson, P. (1996). *Privatization Methods and Madness*, Nelson International, Dar-es-Salaam.
- [41] PCB Phillips, S Shi, J Yu (2015) Testing for multiple bubbles: Historical episodes of exuberance and collapse in the S&P 500.
- [42] PCB Phillips, SP Shi - (2018) Date stamping historical periods of oil price explosivity: 1876–2014.
- [43] Pillay, P. (2002). The role of the state in economic development in southern Africa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Development Policy: Lusaka, Zambia.

- [44] RAIDS, (2013) Privatization in Zambia, Factsheet, Rights & Accountability in Development. <https://www.raid-uk.org/sites/default/files/zambia-factsheets.pdf>
- [45] Ramamurti, R., and Raymond V. (1991). Privatization and State Control of State-Owned Enterprises, EDI Development Studies, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
- [46] RDA, (2019). Road Development Agency 2019 Annual Report, Lusaka, Zambia. www.rda.org.zm
- [47] Republic of Zambia, (2013). *Zambia Review: 14th edition*. Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry.
- [48] Resnick, D., and Thurlow J. (2008). Development Strategies, Macroeconomic Policies, and the Agricultural Sector in Zambia: Ithaca, New York, Cornell University.
- [49] Saasa, O.S. (1996). Policy Reform and Structural Adjustment in Zambia: The Case of Agriculture and Trade, Technical Paper No. 35. Joint Publication of AFR/SD and REDSO/ESA.
- [50] Seshamani, V. (1994). Zambia's Industrial Strategies: Problems and Prospects. African Social Research, 38/38.
- [51] Seshamani, V., & Ndhlovu, O. (2016). The Developmental State. In *The Zambian Society and Economy: Development Policy in Practice*. A Report to AfDB (p. 132).
- [52] Shafer, D. (1994). Zambia: The Mining Sector. In *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States* (pp. 49-93). Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.
- Retrieved July 23, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv2n7fn1.6>
- [53] Simutanyi, N. (1996). The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 825 – 839.
- [54] The New York Times, November 24,(1980)
- [55] The New York Times, November 2,(2005)
- [56] The New-York Times, November5, (2005).
- [57] UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report,(1993)
- [58] UNDP, (1999). The UNDP Human Development Report 1999, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [59] UNECA, (2016). Long-term Development Planning: A Foundation to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa, ECA POLICY BRIEF, No.ECA/16/105. <https://hdl.handle.net/10855/23564>”
- [60] Walsh, Carl. (1993). What Caused the 1990-1991 Recession? *Economic Review*. 2. 33-48.
- [61] World Bank Development Indicators (2021)/data bank <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>
- [62] World Bank, (1994). *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, results and the road ahead*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- [63] Zambia Basic Economic Report, World Bank (1977) FILE COPY - World Bank Documents and Reports.
- [64] Zambia Statistics Agency (2021). *Projected Population and Eligible Voting Population 2020*, Lusaka.