
**The Effectiveness Of The Implementation Of The National
Decentralisation Policy On The Administration Of Public
Service Delivery In Zambia: A Case Study Of Solwezi District**
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Abstract

Zambia Launched the National decentralization policy began working on a national decentralization policy from as far back as 2006 and this policy was finally began operating in 2011 but was only officially launched in 2013. The implementation of the National Decentralisation Policy is aimed at increasing decentralized, local, participatory processes to identify and address priority objectives for poverty reduction, employment creation, gender equity, and environmental regeneration.

There exists a discrepancy between administrative reforms and the improved service delivery they intend to accomplish. The main objective of the research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of the National Decentralisation Policy on the administration of Public Service Delivery in Solwezi District of Zambia.

The study revealed that 77% of the implementers and target groups were aware of the existence of the decentralization policy and only 45% of the citizens (beneficiaries) were aware. Further, the citizen participation in the decentralization process was low with 46.6% in peri-urban and 36.84% in rural areas respectively. The awareness of the

structural changes were high at 81% among the implementers of the decentralization program.

The research revealed that for the decentralisation policy to be complete and for it to create autonomous and semi-autonomous it must ensure that the structural changes ensure that whether it is the reporting structure, new structural creation or structural realignments it must devolves these functions. However, the form of structural decentralisation was mainly only devolution by about 32.20% and 27.12% delegation with the rest being deconcentration and deregulation. Delegation is temporal and deconcentration lacks autonomy while deregulation is only relaxation of legal barriers. The major recommendations in the study were that there is need to increase fiscal decentralization in devolving sources of finance to lower levels; increase public awareness across the broad spectrum of stakeholders; and need to make policy more participatory at all levels including traditional authorities and villages.

Keywords—Decentralisation; Devolution; Awareness; Participation Service Delivery

1. INTRODUCTION

Zambia began working on a national decentralisation policy from as far back as 2006 and this policy, which began operating in 2011 but was only officially launched in 2013. The purpose of the policy was because of the increasing demand on central government for services which could be provided by lower and local structures. Further, there was a huge outcry from various sectors of society over deteriorating service delivery due to red tape, corruption, inefficiency, wastefulness, unresponsiveness and rigidity to change in the face of reforms. ACC (2013) observed that "Bureaucracy and shoddy service delivery are some of the major contributing factors to corrupt practices in the country, hence the need to critically have them checked," it was noted that there is too much shoddy service delivery and red tape which the public has observed in some Government institutions such as the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), Zambia Police Service (ZP), Department of Immigration. Kenyata (2009) reveals that the government has a duty to provide public goods and service to its citizenry. And further that the public service is its vehicle to use in delivering these goods and services. Therefore, the performance of the public sector has a bearing on the quality of service delivered by the government.

The relationship therefore between poor service deliver and corruption are intrinsically related such that they influence each other. In the ACC policy it is revealed that despite the institutional reforms and programmes targeting accountability, transparency, and efficiency in delivery of public services; the obtaining institutional situation as reflected in the National Governance Baseline Survey Report of August 2004 shows that acts of corruption are most prevalent at public goods and services points of delivery. These service delivery points are public offices where the interaction with the citizenry involves: issuance of permits or licenses, expediency of legal proceedings, provision of basic public services (in particular education and health),

expediency of revision of tax, Or expediency of obtaining contracts with state institutions.

The prevalence of corruption at these service delivery points is attributed to: Unregulated official discretion (bureaupathology); Bureaucratic and complex procedures; Lack of transparency in the exercise of public authority; Poor employee culture and motivation; An absence of effective corruption reporting mechanisms; Lack of public and media scrutiny; or, Lack of honesty and integrity.

The lack of accountability, transparency and efficiency results into abuse of power in form of bureaupathology and technocracy hence poor service delivery in Zambia. Several studies have been undertaken on the challenges faced in public service delivery. However, Kenyata (2009); Alornyeku (2011) PSRP (1993); and Mafuleka (1996) noted that the following as the major challenges faced in the efficient and effective delivery services: Lack of adequate education and training decreases administrative efficiency by incapacitating functionaries to act with a minimum of expense, effort and waste; administrative deficiencies and other pathologies; Mismatched recruitment and placement of civil service functionaries at the lower and middle echelons; Highly centralisation of power the central government across vertical and horizontal lines; Blotted size of the bureaucracy- hence functional duplication and overlap of functions across functionaries; Lack of administrative aids such as modern computers for information storage and perusal, including computation; office furniture, electronic phones for administrative communication, as well as transport vehicles; capacity deficiencies within the administrative system,; lack of political will to bring real change in service delivery; Lack of institutional and legal framework to enforce decentralisation reforms, service deliver and curb abuse of power and corruption; Poor Performance Management Packages to motivate employees; Bureaupathology

(including; Under-organisation- centralisation of “attractive” functions and authority at the expense of service delivery and Over-organisation- rules and regulations which minimises the speed in public service delivery); and Technocracy- power being vested in the technocrat as opposed to power being vested in the people (democracy). With these as background factors, many efforts from pre-colonial times at attaining meaningful bureaucratic reforms especially in form of decentralization have failed.

1.1.STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The tenants of good governance demand for among other things responsive and just service delivery, and governments have been under immerse pressure to reform towards adherence to these principles(UNDP 1996). Zambia in its recently launched decentralisation policy in order to adhere to these tenets and enhance participation and service delivery (ZNDP, 2013). Lolojhi 2011 reveals that the policy has pledged to place fiscal and authoritative devolutionary powers to its people and lower structures at provincial, district and local government level. The aim was to ensure that services are brought closer to the people and achieve meaningful economic and human development from the bottom-up approach. However, despite decades of administrative reforms in Zambia, the negative connotations of bureaucracy such as red tape, corruption, inefficiency or wastefulness, unresponsiveness and rigidity to change have characterised the administrative system, processes, structures and functions much to the detriment of service delivery (ACC, 2013). The goals of co-responsibility, high effectiveness, increasing powers of local authorities, good governance, public participation; and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability still remain unattainable. There therefore exists a discrepancy between administrative reforms and the improved service delivery they intend to accomplish. We

therefore evaluate the National Decentralisation Policy and its effectiveness in enhancing the administration of public service delivery.

1.2.RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

General Objective


To evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of the National Decentralisation Policy on the administration of Public Service Delivery in Solwezi District of Zambia.

Specific Research Objectives

- (i) To investigate the extent to which the National decentralisation policy is being implemented.
- (ii) To assess the existing legal institutional framework for the implementation of the policy
- (iii) To evaluate the impact of the implementation of the policy on the administration of public service delivery
- (iv) To assess the challenges faced with the national decentralisation policy implementation framework.
- (v) To make policy, research and practice recommendations on the National Decentralisation Policy.

1.3.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Figure 1 Conceptual Framework



Source: Author, 2019

Many factors affect and are affected by the National Decentralization Policy. Policy decisions are made in consideration and in the context and impact of such factors discussed in the empirical review as:

- PESTEL Factors

These refer to the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Ecological and Legal Context. The Political Agenda of the governing party in power greatly determines the outlook of the policy. This can be seen in the differences between the 2011 version which was a Mwanawasa-Rupiah and MMD-New Deal agenda and the 2013 version which is a Sata-Lungu decentralization Agenda. the economic conditions prevalent in the country, the Societal overview including social trends, culture, customs, traditions, attitudes and perceptions all have serious impact on the policy and its implementation. Technological overplays are a critical ingredient to the success of the policy as information technologies are now more pronounced as data is more widespread were policy performance and comparisons are easier. The ecological and environmental issues surrounding the policy are also impactful in a highly regionalized nation within many local contexts were implementation of the autonomy many spell many ecological concerns. The legal framework many support or deter the support of the policy.

- Decentralization Policy Finance

This refers to two this, the financing of the policy implementation and the eventual fiscal decentralization. The extent to which the policy is funded determines its success or failure.

- Legal Institutional Framework

the availability of laws and institutions and institutional support of the policy is a critical ingredient in either the success of failure of the policy.

- Public Policy Perceptions- how the policy is perceived by the public determines how it is received and supported by the public hence tend to affect its success.

- Public Policy Management- the management of the policy affects its perceptions and vise-visa. How a policy is managed affects the outcome of the policy.

Public Policy output include the following:

- Legal Institutional Framework
- Public Policy Management
- Implementation Framework

2.0.LITERATURE REVIEW

UNDP (2011) notes that “Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the restructuring or reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels. Decentralization could also be expected to contribute to key elements of good governance, such as increasing people's opportunities for participation in economic, social and political decisions; assisting in developing people's capacities; and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability.” UNDP (2011) further argues that while decentralization or decentralizing governance should not be seen as an end in itself, it can be a means for creating more open, responsive, and effective local government and for enhancing representational systems of community-level decision making. By allowing local communities and regional entities to manage their own affairs, and through facilitating closer contact between central and local authorities, effective systems of local governance enable responses to people's

needs and priorities to be heard, thereby ensuring that government interventions meet a variety of social needs. Therefore, in order to increase familiarisation of this phenomenon and to critically investigate it, a preliminary literature review was conducted. This involved obtaining a number of written articles on the research problem and narrowing down to the relevant sources that could aid our understanding of the problem. A review of both empirical and theoretical sources was carried out.

2.1. EXTENT OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

2.1.1. Policy Implementation

PMRC (2018) reported the evaluation of the National Decentralization policy in the Implementation of the National Decentralization Policy of Zambia. They note, just as we noted in the previous section that since independence Zambia has made many efforts at decentralizing its administrative structure such that in the 1970s there was even a ministry of decentralization. They note in their policy analysis that there has been a commitment towards the principle of decentralization.

2.1.2. Decentralization History of Zambia

Alornyeku (2011), notes that centralised development administration in Africa is not new and because Bureaucracy was practiced in the various kingdoms, states and city-states by Kings; Emperors, chiefs and sub-chiefs. He thus reveals, as also noted by Adu-Gyamfi, (2003), that the Pre-colonial traditional bureaucracy was seen in the following:

1. traditional or charismatic leadership which was appointive or selective on the basis of birth and age lineage;
2. authority system derived from positions or statuses;

3. exercise of authority and function on the basis of laid down tradition, cultural norms, policies, rules and regulations;

4. allocation of portfolios, tasks and duties determined by one's skills, competence, experience, courage and exploits;

5. authority and power resided in the traditional head and his council of elders/chiefs/headmen who were the principal bureaucrats;

6. rules, regulations, laws, traditions and customs were used as instrument for social engineering and delivery of public services;

7. the administrative set-up was organised and structured in a way that portrays hierarchies, chain of command, unity of command and span of control;

8. transparency, accountability and responsibility were extracted from office holders where offered services;

9. office holders were not paid salaries but were rewarded in kind;

10. Office holders had security of tenure until they died or were dismissed for incompetence or any other reason.

Zambia like many other former colonies inherited from the colonial government a lot of administrative, social, political and economic ills and systems hence the need to address and redress these inherited ills.

Zambia inherited a heavily rigid and bureaucratic administrative system which favoured the white minority. Zambia's decentralization reforms therefore can be traced from the advent of colonial rule by the British South African Company. On top of the already existing bureaucracy, the company established its own but soon found the territory very huge to administer centrally, and, therefore, it conducted one of the first geographical administrative reforms by

dividing it in 1899 into two parts: North Western Rhodesia which was under the administrative tutelage of King Lewanika and North Eastern Rhodesia whose first administrator was Robert Codrington.

The decentralisation was further expanded in 1911, when North Eastern Rhodesia and North Western Rhodesia amalgamated to form Northern Rhodesia, another geographical reform. The British Government on 1st April 1924 appointed a Governor, Sir Arthur Benson, who introduced further decentralisation by dividing the country into nine administrative units referred to as provinces and appointed a Provincial Commissioner in each province. But In 1935 the regions were grouped into five administrative parts. In 1947 were made.

The number of provinces increased again from five to six and the provinces were fragmented into much smaller administrative units, the districts, with a District Commissioner in each as the field administrative superior. Below the District Commissioners were indigenous administrative structures staffed by local chiefs, headmen and their subjects popularly known by the nomenclature of "Indirect Administration". This hierarchy was headed by the Governor who was answerable to the Colonial Secretary based in London. A slight change occurred in 1953 after the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into the federation. This political event brought in two other functionaries, the Governor General, the Right Honorable Lord Llewellyn, who was a titular political figure based in Salisbury [now Harare], and the executive Prime Minister, Godfrey, Martin, Huggins, who reigned from 18th December 1953 to 2nd November, 1956. He was immediately replaced by Roy Wilensky, whose position ended on 31st December, 1963, the official day when the federation was dissolved.

For ten years between 1953 and 1963 the federal administrative arrangement reigned. It reverted to its pre- federal era after the dissolution of the

federation in 1963. During the colonial period, the decentralisation reforms were tailored to meet the needs of the colonists, for instance the administration of tax collection. With a population of about 3 million between 1953 and 1963, the size of the Northern Rhodesia bureaucracy could have been adequate to meet the needs of the colonial government. This was partly because the larger segment of the population lived in the country-side and government restrictions prevented African exodus to towns and other urban areas which were preserves of whites. The lean bureaucracy was also cheaper to maintain.

Zambia like many other former colonies inherited from the colonial government a lot of social, political and economic ills and inequalities hence the new government faced major challenges in efforts to address and redress these inherited ills. Though Zambia was the economic power house of the region and a hive for employ for many neighboring countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana and the then Zaire, Zambia had a lot to accomplish in improving its socio-economic landscape. Domestically, Zambia had a critical human resource shortage with very few trained and educated Zambians capable of running the government. This presented a huge administrative personnel backlog filed by untrained individuals. Further, the economy too faced an expertise lack such that the industries were largely dependent on foreign expertise. The lack of trained human resource therefore presents a foundational problem for much of the errors in Zambia's national administration and reforms which eventually presented a spill over effect to all other areas and sectors of the country.

The British colonial regime handed down to the Zambian sovereign Government a legacy of 5,883 civil servants. However, after five years of self- rule in 1969, this figure rose to 51,497. The policy of Zambianization and rising copper earnings during that period enabled the Government to expand the

size of the centralised bureaucracy. This expansion was however on the basis of increased employment for blacks and not in the interest of service delivery thus creating the foundation for poor service delivery in the public service.

By the second republic, things worsened as a socialist agenda was introduced. The Zambian centralised bureaucracy was estimated at 140,000 and only 24,000 for the decentralised local government. The total number of ministries had increased from fifteen in 1964 to 16 in 1989. District councils stood at 63. The introduction of a mixed economy influenced by socialist views further gave rise to fusion between the centralised bureaucracies into decentralised units with the running party (UNIP).

To ensure total loyalty to UNIP, the civil service was politicized. Political education courses conducted at planned seminars, workshops or symposia were introduced. A national citizenship college intended to dedicate effort to teaching the curriculum on political education was established in Kabwe. This was however short lived due to the 1972/73 oil shocks and fall of copper priced on the London stock exchange. Compounded by these reduction in the copper prices and a rise in the oil prices, the Zambian economy was seriously weakened. Zambia therefore from the mid-1970s began to experience heightened difficulties financing its development and high social spending hence foreign borrowings increased. The social spending went to finance the huge public service employees' salaries, subsidies on unprofitable industries to avoid job losses, free food distribution programs, heavy agricultural and import subsidies amid many more areas of social spending. This borrowing was done with the hope that the copper prices will soon surge and the government would soon repay the debts however by the early 1980s, it became apparently clear that the debt burden was ever increasing with little hope of dawn with ever increasing commodity prices.

Faced with that crisis, the Zambian Government sought recourse to the international financial institution – the IMF - for aid. Among the conditionalities for providing that aid was the reduction in the public sector employment (Sichone and Simutanyi, 1996). That meant trimming down not only the civil service of the central Government but also the parastatal sector, including the Local Government branch. The Government, fearing violent reaction from the workers, faltered to implement the conditionality.

UNIP finally gave in to pressure give back power to the people through reintroduced multipartism. When MMD Government assumed the reins of power in 1991, it stepped up the pace of change. From 10th to 14th February 1992 the MMD Government convened in Livingstone a one-week workshop of senior public servants, interested citizens and donors. Extensive discussions were conducted on how to decrease the cost of the state administrative machinery and improve its performance. From the workshop came a comprehensive draft plan for decentralisation reforms the public service (GRZ, November 1993).

A second workshop comprising senior public servants was titled “Managing Change in the Public Service” was held in Ndola in July 1992 and refined the earlier draft for public service reform. The Ndola report formed the basis of the official PSRP proposal submitted to the Secretary to the Cabinet in September 1992 which proposed extensive decentralisation reforms. The Government approval of the proposal was announced in a press release by the Secretary to the Cabinet on 8th March 1993. The programme was finally launched in November 1993 whose aim was improving the quality, efficiency, and cost effectiveness of the administrative machinery and was guided by the following objectives:

- To improve Government capacity to formulate, analyze and implement national policies for social and economic development.

- To enhance ministerial capacities to effectively manage public expenditure and meet fiscal stabilization objectives, and;

- To make the public service efficient and responsive to the needs of the country's population by devolving power to local communities (GRZ, November 1993; GRZ, May 1999).

PSRP had set the target of reducing the number of administrative functionaries from 140,000 for Central Government in 1997 to 80,000 and from 24,000 for Local Councils to 18,000 by 1999. Those reductions were expected to compress the wage bill from K231 billion to K180 billion per annum by 2002. The targets were not met. By 2003 there were 120,000 functionaries for the Central Government and about 21,000 for Local Government. The wage bill rose from K1,728 billion in 2003 to K2,317.08 billion in 2005 (PAS April 2005). Structural changes effected by merging institutions or departments resulted in the abolition of 15,000 redundant posts. The retrenchment exercise in some cases was over-done without drawing the equation between the load of work and the remaining number of people to do certain tasks. The attendant effect of that mismatch was heavier load of work for fewer workers.

2.2.LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

They revealed that the core purpose of these efforts at decentralization to primarily attain the vision of a democratic and developmental state. They argue that one can easily trace the commitment towards decentralization in the established legal institutional Framework such as

- National Constitution- where the principle of devolution is strengthened by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, which provides for the system of local government based on democratically elected councils.

- Decentralization Secretariat- The government through Cabinet Office

(Decentralization Secretariat) is developing systems to ensure effective nationwide supervision and co-ordination programme to facilitate smooth implementation of the decentralization process in general and the Circular No. 10 of 2014 in particular.

- The decentralization Policy 2013- The decentralisation policy is a guide to transference of authority, functions and responsibilities to lower levels of governance.

- Circular No 10 of 2014- The Circular served as notice of Government's intention to commence the devolution process, outlined milestones achieved, implementation modalities and phasing of the devolution process. It also provided direction on the institutional framework for the decentralised system of government at all levels

- Seventh National Development Plan (2017-2021) - It is Important to note that Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) were affected by inadequate implementation of the decentralisation policy. The Decentralization policy provides the principles of implementation of the 7NDP and therefore full implementation of the decentralisation policy is a critical condition of success for the implementation of the 7NDP.

- The 2018 National Budget- In the 2018 National Budget, , Government commits to ensuring that finances required to provide front-line public services and infrastructure projects at provincial and district level are deconcentrated to provincial administration.

Based on the above, they conclude that "the regulatory and legal framework governing the implementation of the decentralization policy is visible and adequate to some extent. The main challenge is adequate implementation."

Bureaupathology and technocracy are any form of attitude and behaviour among the centralised bureaucrats and technocrats in service delivery

areas which obstruct progress, achievement of public objectives and customer care and satisfaction. Self (1997) describes bureaupathology and technocracy as negative administrative behaviours of professionals and experts in organization which thwart achievement of public goals and delivery of quality public service to consumers. Modibo (1978) says these are administrative pathologies by which public servants, while misconceiving their powers, functions and responsibilities, act *ultra vires*, in bad faith, out of malice or even with ill-motives, thereby exhorting image, tips, importance and cash benefits from service consumers. He describes bureaupathology and technocracy as phenomena by which public servants use their statuses, positions and authority to carnally procure for themselves some benefits from investors, contractors, consultants and suppliers.

Modibo (ibid) sees bureaupathology in a form of “under-organisation” by which a bureaucrat centralises “attractive” functions and authority in himself when consumers require services. In another sense Modibo sees bureaupathology in “over-organisation” rules and regulations which minimises the speed in public service delivery. Self (1997), calls bureaupathology and technocracy the two administrative evils in public service delivery. He calls them evils because,

1. they are arbitrary due to the use of discretionary power;
2. they violate economic, social and political rights of consumers of public service;
3. they sabotage government socio-economic and political programmes to the disadvantage of constituents;
4. they delay services delivery to strategic investors and other consumers;
5. they are associated with ritualism and self-egoism of professional and experts.

Modibo abhors bureaupathology because, to him, it is associated with:

1. bureaucratic insensitivity;
2. misuse of administrative power and discretion;
3. lack of concern for customers plights;
4. lack of customer focus;
5. misuse of monopoly in service delivery;
6. bribery and corruption.

It is primarily due to these vices that decentralisation is advocated so as to increase emancipation and efficiency of development administration.

ACC (2013) observed that “Centralised bureaucracy and shoddy service delivery are some of the major contributing factors to corrupt practices in the country, hence the need to critically have them checked ,” it was noted that there is too much shoddy service delivery and bureaucracy which the public has observed in some constituencies were a total of ZMW 56 Million was under unaccounted for between 2010-2012 under the CDF decentralisation program. Actually, PMRC (2014) notes that the most significant issues in the current CDFs is related to weak procurement or contract work, unvouched expenditure, and failure to follow procurement procedures. PMRC (2014) further reveals that there exists numerous cases of unspent funds, when monies are not utilised by the end of the financial with over half of the constituencies in 2012 having unspent funds, and amongst these, over 70% of available funds remained unspent. Kenyata (2009) reveals that the government has a duty to provide public goods and service to its citizenry. And further that the public service is its vehicle to use in delivering these goods and services. Therefore, the performance of the public sector has a bearing on the quality of service delivered by the government.

The relationship therefore between poor service deliver, corruption and public participation is intrinsic such that they influence each other. In the ACC policy it is revealed that despite the decentralisation reforms and programmes target accountability and transparency, and efficiency in delivery of public services, the obtaining institutional situation as reflected in the National Governance Baseline Survey Report of August 2004 shows that acts of corruption are most prevalent at public goods and services points of delivery. These service delivery points are public offices where the interaction with the citizenry involves. For example, the prevalence of corruption at these service delivery centres in the CDFs is attributed to:

- i. Unregulated official discretion (bureaupathology);
- ii. Bureaucratic and complex procedures;
- iii. Lack of transparency in the exercise of public authority;
- iv. Poor employee culture and motivation;
- v. An absence of effective corruption reporting mechanisms;
- vi. Lack of public and media scrutiny; or,
- vii. Lack of honesty and integrity.

The lack of accountability, transparency and efficiency results into abuse of power in form of bureaupathology and technocracy hence poor service delivery in Zambia.

Several studies have been undertaken on the challenges faced in decentralisation. However, Kenyata (2009); Alornyeku (2011) PSRP (1993); and Maluleka (1996) noted that the following as the major challenges faced in the efficient and effective delivery services:

1. Lack of adequate education and sensitisation among the general public to provide checks and balances.
2. administrative deficiencies and other pathologies

3. Mismatched decentralised functionaries being given fiscal decentralisation

4. Highly centralisation of power the state bureaucracy across vertical and horizontal lines even at local level.

5. Blotted size of the bureaucracy- hence functional duplication and overlap of functions across decentralised functionaries

6. Lack of administrative aids such as modern computers for information storage and perusal, including computation; office furniture, electronic phones for administrative communication, as well as transport vehicles.

7. capacity deficiencies within the local administrative system,

8. lack of political will to bring real change in decentralisation

9. Lack of institutional and legal framework to enforce decentralisation and curb abuse of power and corruption

10. Bureaupathology including

- i. Under-organisation- centralisation of “attractive” functions and authority at the expense of service delivery.
- ii. Over-organisation- rules and regulations which minimises the speed in public service delivery
- iii. Technocracy- power being vested in the technocrat as opposed to power being vested in the people (democracy).

2.3.POLICY IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTATION

PMRC (2018) reveals that although the policy states that Government will realign functions and linkages of central, provincial, district and sub-district governance structures with matching resources, the reality of this has not been seen thus far. This implies that functional and structural decentralization is going on without corresponding fiscal decentralization. They note further that there

has also been delays in the implementation of the policy. Furthermore, they note that while there has been a creation of several new district councils and one province to demonstrate Government's commitment to deliver quality services that are easily accessible to the people, this does not guarantee success for several reasons and these include:

- The number of districts in Zambia increased from 72 in 2012 to 103 in 2014. However, the budgetary allocations still remained the same.
- There has been no successful decentralization for increased community participation and improved service delivery.
- In most cases, the districts have been created but not given power or authority for decision-making and resource mobilization.
- Establishment of Ward Development Committees (WDCs) without adequate CDF allocations

In their policy review, they note, after engagements with the Decentralization Secretariat, that some of the major challenges faced in the implementation of the decentralization policy include the following;

1. The Context is which the policy is being implemented:

Strong overarching legacy of centralization (resistance) affecting institutions and mind-sets at all levels. In some cases and locations, there is a general resistance or reluctance to change and this is evident in the lack of willingness by various officers to be involved in the decentralization process.

Widely held poor image of Councils in Human Resource Management (HRM) and service delivery. Councils across the country have a poor image of poor service delivery,

2. Complexity:

Decentralization reform covers a wide scope and depth of functions and actors as already stated. Interrelationships between objectives and outcomes typically are not immediately visible to most actors

3. Program management- Extensiveness and depth of scope possess substantial program management challenge for limited DS structure

4. Inadequate financing and insufficient capacity building.

5. Limited coordinated efforts to implement the policy

6. Lack of a clear road map concerning decentralization policy. Coordination in terms of budgeting, there was no directive in terms of budgets which were submitted but not followed.

In view of the above challenge therefore PRMC recommends that the government must;

1. Strengthen the M&E mechanisms set to monitor the effectiveness of the policy progressively.

2. Reinforce institutional and individual capacity building for exceptional performance.

3. Review objectives, strategies and implementation plan of the policy

4. Ensure financial resources are available for activities and functions to be carried out while reinforcing and building capacity for revenue collection. (Broaden the revenue collection for devolved entities)

Therefore, despite the many elaborate statements made in the national decentralization policy the above ideals still remain a far-fetched dream. Despite government's functional and fiscal devolution through the NDP it is clear that the intended goals have not been met hence a need to investigate the efficacy of the NDP in structural, fiscal and functional decentralization in attaining meaningful development and participation but most especially enhance service delivery. This research therefore is an effort at evaluating the

decentralization policy and its efficacy in enhancing service delivery.

National Government administration is universally agreed among administration and management scholars as being built on the concept of bureaucracy yet not all believe that there is or should be the pure form of bureaucracy. In fact, while there is a universal application of the concept of bureaucracy to National government administration, there is no universal acceptance of the definition of the concept and the connotations it presents. Generally, as noted by Mtetesha (2013) bureaucracy is a type of formal administration with the characteristics of division of labour, rules and regulation, hierarchy of authority, impersonality of social relationships and technical competence. These features are as articulated by the father of modern bureaucracy, Max Weber a German Administrative Economist whose primary motive in propounding the concept was to dispel the arguments brought about by Karl Max's world view. According to Alornyeku (2011) the whole essence of the concept of bureaucracy as applied in modern day management is to ease large organization management, achieve administrative efficiency and create greater accountability..

However, bureaucracy has come to mean more than just the defined formal administration above but also red tape and dreary procedural responsiveness especially public sector organisations and personnel who have even come to be known as the bureaucracy or bureaucrats respectively. The public sector as also noted by Alornyeku(2011) are not perturbed by the quality of services delivered and have for ages, remained unchanged, probably due to the fact that, public-sector organisations do not normally face the threat of competition by rivals providing similar services. This attitude gives bureaucracy a bad name, as evidenced by poor services offered by many of these public institutions.

The persistence of red tape has resulted into corrupt activities such as bribery just to enhance the responsiveness of bureaucrats. Most governments inclusive of the Zambian government has identified this. In a bid therefore to win public confidence, curb corruption and make expected socio-economic gains, the Zambian government have introduced administrative reforms in the public/civil services and the Passport Office has been no exemption.

2.4. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION

The theory that best explained the study and the challenges in implementation and service delivery is the Public Choice Theory founded by James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock in 1962. Public Choice Theory was directed towards the study of politics based on economic principles. The most important contribution of Public Choice Theory is that it recognizes politicians as being motivated by self-interest and their expectations change drastically. It is the behaviour of public sector bureaucrats which is at the heart of the theory. The Theory asserts that while the politicians and bureaucrats are supposed to work in the public interest, putting into practice policies of the government as efficiently and effectively as possible, Public Choice Theorists see bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers motivated by such factors as: salary, prerequisite of the office, public reputation, power and patronage (Niskanen, W. A, Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973).

The theory further states that an official at any level, be they in the public or private sector acts at least partly in his own self-interest. Among the proponents of the theory include: Down Anthony who asserts that broader motivations such as pride and performance, royalty to a programme, department or government and a wish to best serve their fellow citizens may also affect the bureaucrat's behaviour. He further states that government will provide what voters want and not

necessarily what is beneficial. Thus the central reality for governments is citizens' vote and not their welfare. Niskanen is another proponent who also states that self-interest is the sole motivator.

The theory will be of great importance to the study as it clearly explained why for example is there poor performance and poor public participation of the CDFs which is part of the NDP? Furthermore, the theory at the same time explained why government formulated and implemented the NDP. This was because politicians saw it as one way through which they could gain support from the citizens or voters. The NDP is therefore, best explained by the theory as being a function of the self-interests of the politicians to realize their own self-interests.

2.5.CONCLUSION

Bureaucracy in its worst form can be very counterproductive especially centralized bureaucracy hence the need for decentralized bureaucracy. Despite over 50 decades of bureaucratic reforms in Zambia, we have still not evolved to a system closer to the ideal form proposed by Max Weber and our best hopes and aspirations seems to be embedded within the Decentralization Policy however, after decades of policy planning and years of implementation there is still very little to show from the policy in terms of increased service delivery effectiveness hence the goal of this research to uncover the issues with the policy and its implementation.

3.0.METHODOLOGY

The review of literature summarised above is evident of a lot of information gaps and contextual problems. Using a non-experimental design within descriptive and analytical approaches, therefore, this research evaluated the Effectiveness of the National Decentralisation Policy on the administration of Public Service Delivery in Zambia. The Scope thus encompasses two main constructs (National Decentralisation Policy and

Administration and one exclusive cases study (Solwezi) from which our generalizations shall be drawn.

3.1.STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLE SIZE

A sample of 140 respondents was used. A convenient-snowball sampling approach was employed to sample 5 informants drawn from the Municipal Council within Solwezi District, 5 key informants from the Provincial Administrative office, 5 key informants from the 5 district administrative offices, 5 from 5 public service agencies in the districts (Citizen Registration Office, District Agricultural Extension Office, Social Welfare Office, RATSA, ZRA) and 5 traditional leaders from chiefdoms within the District. We also got two key informants one each from PSMD and Decentralization Secretariat. 40 clients (Citizens) will be interviewed at each of the five public service agencies. The sampling methods used was primarily purposive snowball sampling. The research used three different sampling frames all taken from the Provincial Administrative office's records of employees.

3.2.DATA COLLECTION

The study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data was generally very useful in that the information collected was less distorted and very reliable because it came directly from the respondents. Data collection tools included a triangulation of three tools including a questionnaire and interview guide and Focus group discussion.

3.3.DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

Data entry and analyses involving mainly frequencies and percentages were done using STATA 13 for the research questionnaire responses while interview guide responses were transcribed and fed into either STATA 13 or Microsoft Excel for further analysis.

3.4.SCOPE AND CONSTRAINTS

Several research and scope related boundaries were met which includes time, financial and resource constraints which limited the study to North Western Province's Solwezi District. Time constraints were primarily due to limits of the academic calendar in which this project was undertaken. This period includes all processes needed for report compilation including data collection, analysis and reporting. Financial and material constraints were met. The study therefore has a limited scope encompasses two main variables and one exclusive cases study from which our generalisations are drawn were applicable.

3.5.ETHICAL CONCERNS AND GENERALISATION:

In the process of collecting primary data, the researcher abided by the ethics governing research and data collection. Consequently, the research fulfilled the following ethical requirements during the process of conducting the interviews:

- 1) Explained benefits of the study to the interviewees
- 2) protected respondents' rights and identity
- 3) Obtained informed consent from the respondents:
- 4) ensured voluntary participation
- 5) Steps were taken to ensure Validity, Reliability and Generalization of the Study standards were met through rigorous peer reviews:

4.0.PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

4.1.INTRODUCTION

Decentralization has emerged as the hallmark of democracy and as seen in the previous chapters, it requires real commitment and political will to thrive. This section therefore presents the field data as well as providing the relevant interpretations. It uses figures to give descriptive information while also providing a factor comparative analysis to give analytical information on the phenomenon. The

data presentation is arranged using headings and sub-headings that are consistent with the research objectives with an addition of background factor analysis. The findings of the study were guided by the following objectives:

Objective One: To investigate the extent to which the National Decentralisation Policy is being implemented. This objective is addressed beginning with extent of implementation in terms of increasing public and implementer awareness; then the extent to which Structural, functional and Fiscal Decentralisation have been achieved.

Objective Two: To assess the existing legal institutional framework for the implementation of the policy. This objective is addressed by firstly evaluating the availability of the legal institutional framework and thereafter assessing its efficacy or effectiveness.

Objective Three: To evaluate the impact of the implementation of the policy on the administration of public service delivery. This is the crux of the research were an assessment of the impact in terms of ratings and outcomes vis-à-vis the above two objects and the last objective.

Objective Four: To assess the challenges faced with the national decentralization policy implementation framework. This objective is addressed by assessing the challenges faced in effective policy and service delivery linkage. It therefore assesses the factors contributing to the gaps between implementation and service delivery outcomes


Background Characteristics

4.1.1. Distribution Statistics of Respondents

The respondents were evenly stratified by institutions such that each institution provided ten (10) respondents with only the ward Development Committee providing 20 drawn from 5 wards. There was a stratified sampling of the key respondents with 9 stratum from which a total of

10 key respondents were drawn these nine stratum of government institutions and Traditional Authorities. The equal stratification was to ensure that all the eight units have an equal voice as well as an equal and non-zero chance of being selected

Figure 2- Respondents by Age



Source: Author Analysis, 2019


Figure 2 above shows the key respondents by their age and shows that major of the respondents are aged between 36 and 40 Years followed by those aged between 26 and 30 Years. The working age is indicative of an older middle-aged population. This can be attributed to the employment policies of the government that has seen several employment freezes between 2001 and 2005 and between 2007 and 2008 as well as between 2011 and 2013. This has slowed the inflow of a younger workforce hence an aging public service.

AWARENESS AND EXTENT OF IMPLEMENTATION

Decentralisation Policy

A question was posed on whether the respondents are aware of the existence of the National Decentralisation.

Figure 3- Awareness of National Decentralization Policy




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

In terms of awareness of the policy, 77% of the key respondents are aware of the existence of the policy as noted in figure 5 above. However, only 45% of the Citizens are aware as shown in table 10 below. This provides a sharp contrast which is against the main policy objective of increased citizen participation.

Extent of Financial/Fiscal Decentralisation

Figure 4- Whether there is Fiscal Decentralization




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

Asked whether there has been fiscal decentralisation, majority 63% said no.

Efficacy of Legal Policy Documents

The Constitution


Figure 5- Adequacy of the Constitution



Source: Author Analysis, 2019

As evident above the constitution got a rating skewed towards adequacy with 55% of the respondents finding it adequate. However, 29% of the total respondents stated that they are not familiar with the document. Circular 10 of 2014

Figure 6- Adequacy of Circular 10 of 2014




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

Here, the data is skewed to adequacy hence the document was rated adequate despite 46% not being familiar with the document.

The National Budget

Figure 7- Adequacy of the Budget




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

The chart above reveals that the rating data skewed towards inadequacy with a cumulative percentage of 66%. This does not include the 50% who stated that they are not familiar with the document.

Zambia National Decentralisation Policy of 2013


Figure 8- Adequacy of the ZNDP of 2013



Source: Author Analysis, 2019

The chart above indicates that the policy document was rated favourably among those with access to it such that the data is skewed towards adequacy with a cumulative percentage of 60%. This is exclusive of the 50 who are not familiar with the policy document.


Adequacy of 7th National Development Plan
Figure 9- Adequacy of 7th National Development Plan



Source: Author Analysis, 2019

As evident in the chart above, the 7th National Development plan was rated very inadequate. National Decentralisation Secretariat Plan 2016

Figure 10- Adequacy of the 2016 Secretariat Plan




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

Despite only being accessed by 24%, the rating among the 24 is very inadequate as noted in the figure above.

Implementation

Figure 11- Institutional Policy Implementer




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

The respondents were asked who is responsible for implementation of in their administrative structure. Figure above shows that while majority (42%) are not aware, majority of those who are aware indicated mainly the council secretary (32%), Permanent Secretary (24%) and Provincial Minister 2%.

POLICY IMPACT


Figure 12- Whether Policy Improved Service Delivery



Source: Author Analysis, 2019

Figure 12 above reveals that majority of the key respondents feel the policy has not enhanced their service delivery capacity. Specially, the key informants were asked to specifically rate the impact of the policy on key aspects of public service delivery and decentralisation goals and the chart below gives the rating outcome.

Figure 13- Policy Impact Efficacy Rating




Source: Author Analysis, 2019

As evident in figure 17 above, the policy has had:

- The highest impact on Accountability with 26-54% giving it greater extent impact
- Least impact on Administrative Efficiency with only 2% giving it a greater impact rating
- The rest were rated as follows:
 - Co-Responsibility 6-30%
 - Professionalism 4-29%
 - Service Delivery 10-35%
 - Effectiveness 8-23%
 - Citizen Participation 10-29%
 - Good governance 12-37%
 - Service Responsiveness 10-39%
 - Transparency-16-44%

Figure 14- Citizen Service Rating Scale



Source: Author Analysis, 2019

As noted above, the attainment of:


- Accountability is rated between 5.56% and 19.45%
- Transparency is rated Between 2.78% and 25%
- Service Responsiveness is rated between 2.78% and 50%
- Good Governance is rated between 8.33% and 50%
- Citizen Participation is rated between 11.11% and 50%
- Service Effectiveness is rated between 5.56% and 22.22%
- Service Delivery is rate between 5.56% and 44.45%
- Service Professionalism is rated between 8.33% and 38.89%
- Efficiency is rated between 5.56% and 25%
- Co-Responsibility is rated between 11.11% and 27.78%

There, though accountability is the most highly ranked among the public service providers it is the least ranked among the public service seekers. There is therefore a big discrepancy between public perceptions of service provision against those of public institutions.

Citizens/Customers were then asked to rate the satisfaction with the services received and the chart below gives the outcome.

CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Figure 15- Whether Policy need Improvements



Source: Author Analysis, 2019

Asked whether the policy needs improvements, the key informants overwhelmingly (90%) were affirmative as noted above.

The majority (31.11%) feel there is need to increase public awareness, 25.56% feel the secretariat should be decentralised, 22.22% feel there in need for greater fiscal decentralisation, 12.22% feel the solution lies in increasing the authority of the task force, 4.44% feel the solution is in the political will and another 4.44% feel the policy should be made more participatory.

On the part of the citizens, asked what they feel are the challenges with the policy they gave the responses tabulated below.

As noted above majority feel there is general lack of awareness (52.63%), poor implementation (23.68%), Lack of political will (13.16%) and No roadmap (10.535).

A follow-up question was posed to the key respondents who felt the policy does not need improvements as to what can be done moving forward.

5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

As noted in the introduction of the literature review, UNDP revealed the fact that decentralization as the restructuring or reorganization of authority has an objective to increase the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance whose output is service delivery by increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels often termed as local administrative structure. The data has revealed many outstanding facts of Zambia's decentralisation process in general but Solwezi district in particular.

AWARENESS AND EXTENT OF IMPLEMENTATION

Decentralisation Policy

The Study has revealed that 77% of the key respondents are aware of the existence of the policy and only 45% of the Citizens are aware. There is therefore high awareness among the policy implementers but low awareness among the citizens. This is seen as a pitfall in effective policy implementation as noted by NOUN (2011) who argue that development of effective public policy requires several factors namely:

- 1) Awareness that policies and government programmes have to be realized for the benefits of the citizens hence citizens must be aware of the that fact;
- 2) Expanding the roles of citizens in governance, service delivery and providing

welfare activities to the citizens and the primary target.

A further investigation on citizen participation revealed that the highest levels of awareness at 66.67% was urban are aware. Peri-urban had 46.67% awareness and rural areas recorded 36.84% which is the lowest level of awareness by residential area. The stratification of different awareness levels is best explained Almond and Verba (1966) who differentiated between parochial, subject, and participant political culture. Often every political system is defined by one of these but the reality is that they all exist in every society and every political system.

The parochial is likened to the rural residents who have little awareness of, or orientation toward, wither the political system as a whole, the input process, the output process, or the citizen as a political participant. They therefore have little to no awareness of policies and programs. The parochial expect nothing from the system. Almond and Verba (1966) suggest that this is dominant in African chiefdoms and kingdoms and tribal societies, and modern-day Italy, are illustrative of parochial political cultures. This is seen in the fact that 100% of the traditional authority (Sub-Chiefs) had wrong perceptions of the policy. In a subject political culture, which is likened to the Peri-Urban Residents, the citizen is oriented toward the political system and the output process; yet, he has little awareness of input processes or himself as participant. He is aware of governmental authority, he may like or dislike it, but he is essentially passive. He is, as the term implies, a subject.

In the participant political culture likened to Urban residence, which Almond and Verba (1966) notes to have a high level of political awareness and information and have explicit orientations towards the political system as a whole, its input and output processes, and meaningful citizens participation in politics and policies. Include in this orientation is an understanding of how individual and groups can influence decision-making. Some of the

implications of these differences in political culture for policy formation seem readily apparent. Obviously, citizens' participation in policy formation in a parochial political culture may believe that he can do little to influence public policy whether he likes it or not.

The same can be used to explain individual customers who have greater awareness as private players hence tend to take up a more participant culture. On the other hand, Public service employees tend to be subject to "the government of the day" hence have a more subject culture. This explain the fact that despite 77% awareness of the existence of the policy only 24.66% had correct perception of the implementation authority of the policy. We also see further evidence in the data pattern which indicates that the majority members of every implementing institution do not believe they are implementer of the policy hence the input side of the policy process. Business representatives tend to have greater independence and autonomy from the government hence care less of public administrative policies and more on of the business administrative policies such that only 10% awareness among private business representatives.

Structural Decentralisation

Decentralisation be complete has to decentralises structures, functions and finances hence complete administrative and fiscal decentralisation. In decentralisation, new structures have to be put in place or old structures have to be devolved if meaningful change has to occur. The focus group discussion unveiled many key facts about structural decentralisation which include:

- 1) Changes in Report Structures (Line Ministry Functionaries, accounting reports)
- 2) Creation of new structures (Districts, Positions/Authority Structures, new line ministries)
- 3) Alignment of Old Structures (Ministry alignment, functional alignment)

The awareness of Structural Changes was high such that 81% of the implementers. Existence of changes

however may not really result in effective implementation as the policy ultimately gives more power to the people and to local structures and these are found in the villages and wards. However, as noted in the research no structural changes have occurred at local level in terms of Traditional Authority and Wards. This implies that current changes are only impacting central government and local government administrative units without affecting the structures which are directly dealing with the ordinary citizens. This also explains the low level of awareness and participation of the citizenry in the policy process hence the little real impact on the ground.

For the decentralisation policy to be complete and for it to create autonomous and semi-autonomous it must ensure that the structural changes ensure that whether it is the reporting structure, new structural creation or structural realignments it must devolves these functions. However, the form of structural decentralisation was mainly only devolution by about 32.20% and 27.12% delegation with the rest being Deconcentration and deregulation. Delegation is temporal and Deconcentration lacks autonomy while deregulation is only relaxation of legal barriers. These three are however the main forms of structural decentralisation happening in the District. There is therefore an evident lack of real creation of autonomous to semi-autonomous structures in the district other than the district real alignment. The kind of structural decentralisation is inadequate to meet the demands of the participatory and service delivery needs that the policy intends to achieve and this will be seen more evidently in the coming sub sections of the report.

Functional Decentralisation

Another key feature of effective administrative/political decentralisation is functional decentralisation. It is important at this point to not the difference between administrative and political decentralisation as the difference is telling in terms of the decentralisation

implementation in the district. Administrative decentralisation, also known as Deconcentration, refers to a transfer to lower-level central government authorities, or to other local authorities who are upwardly accountable to the central government (Ribot 2002). In contrast, political, or democratic, decentralisation refers to the transfer of authority to representative and downwardly accountable actors, such as elected local governments". Functional decentralisation involves transfer of functions through devolution, deregulation, delegation and Deconcentration. The report reveals that the awareness of current Functional Change is as low as 63%, lower than that of structural changes. Structural changes in are incomplete without real functional changes hence tend to be temporal. Decentralisation is thus only complete if the structures are devolved with the functions. The challenge currently is that for instance, the report structure for the education, agriculture, culture, health, police department up to inspector rank, community development, social welfare departments will be reporting to the council (structural change) while the line ministries will continue to keep the line ministry functions. It is therefore only administrative decentralisation going on as opposed to Political decentralisation which entails creation of autonomous and semi-autonomous units Therefore, the council will have no real authority over these functionaries as they are upwardly accountable to central government. If the structural change of the reporting structure is to be complete, then the entire departments' functions should be transferred to the council with the resource base that backs their sponsorship.

Nurmandi and Kim, (2015) notes that "Political decentralization can be understood to refer to either or both of the following:

- i. Transferring the power of selecting political leadership and representatives from central governments to local governments, and
- ii. Transferring the power and authority for making socio-politico-economic decisions

from central governments to local governments and communities:

Therefore, as revealed in the research outcomes above, former is not included in the existing decentralisation framework while the latter takes mainly structural realignments of the authority structures many of which does not need constitutional or legislative authority hence falls short of the demands of complete political decentralisation. UNPAN (2015) further notes that the promotion of political decentralization entails more than putting structural arrangements (Structural decentralisation) but that it provides the power and authority to decide and elect leaders or representatives within the structures including the full range transfer of decision-making from central government to local governments / authorities / communities. UNPAN (2015) argues here that this requires a process that combines vertical and horizontal decentralization. While vertical decentralization transfers power and authority from central government to local government/authorities/communities, horizontal decentralization empowers the local communities and enables them to receive and utilize the powers that are transferred to them especially in problem analysis, priority setting, planning, and constantly demanding accountability from their local and national leadership or any governance actor at the local level. They further reveal that horizontal decentralization would require growth of civil society as well as structuring local governments in such a way that they are legally obliged to seek and promote the participation of the local communities in setting priorities, planning and making decisions that the local governments will implement in a whole range of socio-politico- economic activities. The fact that there is lesser functional change at local government level and no functional change at traditional Authority Level while structural changes exist implies a break between the vertical and horizontal decentralisation.

Financial/Fiscal Decentralisation

Fiscal decentralisation is the least form of decentralisation currently under implementation such that even among policy implementers only 37% have seen fiscal decentralisation. Jorge (2017) reveals that without fiscal decentralisation, there is no real autonomy power transfer. He identifies several impact factors that resulted in this conclusion and these include:

Service delivery, infrastructure, and expenditure composition- Oates's (1972) theorem predicts a greater efficiency of decentralized service delivery in terms of allocative efficiency, production efficiency; that is, delivering a particular bundle of public services at a minimum cost, then translating into an increased quality and quantity of the services.

Many researchers find decentralization affects education outcomes positively. In turn, cross-country studies also tend to confirm the positive outcomes of decentralization on education (Falch and Fischer 2012 for OECD countries).

The findings for health services confirm that decentralization has similar virtuous effects. Positive results are found in Argentina by Habibi et al (2003),

Fiscal decentralization enhances economic efficiency may have a corresponding effect on the dynamic setting of economic growth (Oates 1993).

Fiscal Decentralisation provides macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability as illustrated by the experiences of Argentina and Brazil. This is because decentralization itself could encourage the governments' fiscal discipline. Providing all levels of government with sufficient tax autonomy would encourage fiscal responsibility, while vertical and horizontal virtuous fiscal competition would shrink the monopolistic power of the central government (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).

Fiscal Decentralisation impacts income inequality and poverty by directly facilitating access to basic

services, and also indirectly in many ways (by means of growth, expenditure composition, the quality of governance). Ultimately, those impacts will depend on the specific characteristics of each decentralization process. It enhances reduced income inequality and poverty reduction both across the local communities and at individual level.

Fiscal decentralisation impacts geographical and interregional disparities- Fiscal decentralization may also affect regional economic convergence and dampen disparities in public services availability especially in marginalised regions.

Fiscal decentralisation impacts government size and public policies- there is robust evidence that increases in sub-national employment following decentralization often overwhelms the corresponding decreases at the central level (Martinez-Vazquez and Yao 2009 for a panel of countries; Marqués and Rosselló 2004 for Spain; Rajaraman and Saha 2008 for India). The increased fiscal responsibility and increased tax competition such that competition for tax bases leads to lower tax rates through a process that has been dubbed “a race to the bottom”. On the other hand, when sub-national interjurisdictional competition takes place using public infrastructure and other of private productivity-enhancing policies, the result can be excessive public spending and larger government size.

Fiscal decentralisation also impacts governance, accountability, and corruption- it is expected that governance and decentralization support each other in a bidirectional causal relationship. One noticeable way in which decentralization can improve governance is by its impact on enhancing accountability and institutional quality. Greater accountability at the sub-national level can accrue in different

Fiscal Decentralisation impacts participation in voter turnout, party system nationalization, and national unity (Reif and Schmitt, 1984).

Therefore, where results indicate no fiscal decentralisation among traditional Authorities, agencies and central government structures is quite a counteractive to the entire decentralisation process and outcomes as it impacts the possibility to attain the above objectives. Even though a higher level of fiscal decentralisation occurred in the local authorities it takes the nature of deregulation and increased financial control of resources allocated not the sources of resources hence control still exists at the point of allocation, were it can be reduced or increased as a means of control.

LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Six key Legal-Policy documents are critical in the implementation and understanding of the policy and as noted by PMRC (2017) include:

National Constitution- this is the principle of decentralisation is strengthened by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, which provides for the system of local government based on democratically elected councils.

Decentralisation Secretariat- The government through Cabinet Office (Decentralisation Secretariat) is developing systems to ensure effective nationwide supervision and co-ordination programme to facilitate smooth implementation of the decentralisation process in general and the Circular No. 10 of 2014 in particular.

The Decentralisation Policy 2013- The Decentralisation policy is a guide to transference of authority, functions and responsibilities to lower levels of governance.

Circular No 10 of 2014- The Circular served as notice of Government’s intention to commence the

devolution process, outlined milestones achieved, implementation modalities and phasing of the devolution process. It also provided direction on the institutional framework for the decentralised system of government at all levels.

Seventh National Development Plan (2017- 2021)- It is Important to note that Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) were affected by inadequate implementation of the decentralisation policy. The Decentralization policy provides the principles of implementation of the 7NDP and therefore full implementation of the decentralisation policy is a critical condition of success for the implementation of the 7NDP.

The 2018 National Budget- In the 2018 National Budget, Government committed to ensuring that finances required to provide front-line public services and infrastructure projects at provincial and district level are deconcentrated to provincial administration.

The Constitution

As noted earlier, the principle of devolution is strengthened by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, which provides for the system of local government based on democratically elected councils however it is also weakened by giving the central government too much power to especially fiscal authority such that fiscal power devolution requires constitutional amendments to be legitimatised unless these powers are delegated by central government. There is therefore a problem of technocracy bureau pathologies in the executive powers given by the constitution vis-à-vis the fiscal and functional devolution. While .55% of the respondents finding it adequate. It is also important to note that 45% found it inadequate and as much as 29% of the total respondents couldn't assess it provision because they are not familiar with the document.

Circular 10 of 2014

This another very highly rated white elephant in the legal policy framework as noted by Phiri (2018). The Circular brought great hope that finally the national decentralisation policy is now under implementation with a road map of implementation, however it only acted as a notice of Government's "intention" to commence the devolution process however the timeline given in the circular is far in the past with very little accomplishments it show. Despite an elaborate outline of milestones, implementation modalities and phasing of the devolution process the circular was highly adequate as rated by the policy implementers where the majority rated it very adequate. While it provided direction on the institutional framework for the decentralised system of government at all levels it lacked critical information on the specific legal institutional coordination of the policy formation. Further, the document is very rare to find such that even 46% of policy makers are not familiar with the document.

The National Budget

As noted above, the 2018 National Budget and the budget speech reflects statements of commitment to the decentralisation policy. It provided funding for further development of the new province and new districts however, Solwezi's two aligned districts benefited little from these funds as noted by a discussant of the FGD. The critical lacking of the devolution of sources of funding further undermines the premise of impactful fiscal decentralisation. As a result of these 66% of policy makers rated it inadequate with 50% of the total respondents are not familiar with the document.

Zambia National Decentralisation Policy of 2013

As noted repeatedly, the decentralisation policy is a guide to transference of authority, functions and responsibilities to lower levels of governance. In formulating the National Decentralisation Policy, comprehensive consultations with various

stakeholders were held in order to build consensus and create a sense of ownership. Hence the document formulation policy had a multi stakeholder approach making it quite adequate. It involved the following groupings:

- a) The National Steering Committee and sub-committees formed to spearhead the development of the Policy;
- b) Chiefs, Senior Civil Servants, Councillors, members of general public and private the general public and private sector, Non-Governmental Organisations and Co-operating Partners who attended provincial and district workshops which were conducted in January and April 1996;
- c) Permanent Secretaries drawn from Sector Ministries and Provinces through Seminars, Meetings and Workshops conducted in 1997, 1998 and 1999; and
- d) Committee of Permanent Secretaries drawn from Sector Ministries and Town Clerks and Council Secretaries through a series of workshops held in 2001 for their valuable guidance and critical comments on the drafts.
- e) The World Bank, United Nations Development Programme and the Overseas Development Agency currently Department for International Development through Local Government Support Project for the technical and financial support during the development of the policy.

Studying through this document, resulted in a majority 60% rated it adequacy with a greater majority rating it very adequate. However certain inadequacies are very clear in that many policy statements on fiscal and political decentralisation hung without implementation plans. The document is not in wide circulation such that 50% of implementers are not familiar with the policy document

National Development Plan

The 7th National Development Plan (7NDP), Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) are faced with critical implementation failures attributed to the failure of the National Decentralisation policy. While the Decentralization policy provides the principles of implementation of the 7NDP, the 7NDP provides the framework for its implementation and therefore full implementation of the decentralisation policy through there framework of the 7NDP is critical to the policy success. However, there is very little provisions for decentralisation implementation in the 7NDP hence a critical mismatch in the policy. This could be the reason why the 7th National Development plan was rated very inadequate by the policy implementers on of who cited the lack of harmony and complementarity with the decentralisation policy. To add to this, over 70% are not familiar with the document hence it is also the poorest availed documents among the respondents.

National Decentralisation Secretariat Plan 2016

The national Decentralisation Secretariat plan was rated very inadequate. The Cabinet Office's Decentralisation Secretariat's plan is summarised in the Circular No. 10 of 2014, however the plan is expected to be more detailed and more readily available legal policy documents (76 % are not familiar with the document). The lack of adequate details in a developing system to ensure effective nationwide supervision and co-ordination programme to facilitate smooth implementation is the greatest weakness of the document.

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